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Abstract 
This paper shows the employment structure of 16 European countries has been polarizing in 
recent years with the employment shares of managers, professionals and low-paid personal 
services workers increasing at the expense of the employment shares of middling 
manufacturing and routine office workers. To explain this job polarization, the paper 
develops and estimates a simple model to capture the effects of technology, globalization, 
institutions and product demand effects on the demand for different occupations. The results 
suggest that the routinization hypothesis of Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) is the single 
most important factor behind the observed shifts in employment structure. We find some 
evidence for offshoring to explain job polarization although its impact is much smaller. We 
also find that shifts in product demand are acting to attenuate the polarizing impact of 
routinization and that differences or changes in wage-setting institutions play little role in 
explaining job polarization in Europe. 
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1. 1. 1. 1.        INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION 
 
  Economists  and  non-economists  alike  have  long  been  fascinated  by  the  ever-
changing occupational structure of employment. Economists have developed a number 
of  hypotheses  about  the  driving  forces  behind  these  changes.  The  most  popular 
emphasize  the  importance  of  technological  change,  globalization  (partly  driven  by 
technology, but perhaps partly also an independent force from declining man-made 
barriers to trade), and labor market institutions (e.g. that alter the relative wages of 
different types of labor).  
  In  the  1980s  and  1990s,  the  dominant  view  among  labor  economists  was  that 
technology was more important than trade as a driving force behind changes in the 
structure of employment (see, for example, Johnson 1997; Desjonqueres, Machin and 
Van Reenen 1999; Autor and Katz 1999), and that technological change was biased in 
favor of skilled workers, leading to the hypothesis of skill-biased technological change 
(SBTC) (see, for example, Krueger 1993; Berman, Bound and Griliches 1994; Berman, 
Bound  and  Machin  1998;  Machin  and  Van  Reenen  1998;  Autor,  Katz  and  Krueger 
1998). More recently, views have been shifting somewhat. 
  First, there is a more nuanced view of the impact of technological change on the 
demand  for  different  types  of  labor.  Autor,  Levy  and  Murnane  (2003)  (ALM)  argue 
persuasively that technology can replace human labor in routine tasks – tasks that can 
be expressed in step-by-step procedures or rules – but (as yet) cannot replace human 
labor  in  non-routine  tasks.  The  routinization  hypothesis  is  intuitively  plausible  and 
ALM provide evidence that industries in which routine tasks were heavily used have 
seen the most adoption of computers, and this has reduced the usage of labor input of 
routine tasks in those industries. The important point is that ‘routine’ does not map 
simply into a one-dimensional definition of skill (Goos and Manning 2007). Although 
low-skill production-line jobs in manufacturing can be characterized as ‘routine’, so 
can many more skilled craft jobs and many clerical jobs that never were the lowest 
paid jobs in the economy. In contrast, many of the worst-paying jobs, for example in   3 
housekeeping, hotel  and catering  and personal  care, are non-routine in nature  and 
therefore  have  been  relatively  unaffected  by  technological  change.  As  a  result,  the 
distribution of jobs is ‘polarizing’ with faster employment growth in the highest and 
lowest-paying jobs and slower growth in the middling jobs. Recent empirical work has 
shown  how  this  has  been  happening  in  the  US  (Juhn  1994,  1999;  Acemoglu  1999; 
Autor, Katz and Kearney 2006, 2008; Lemieux 2008; Autor and Dorn 2010; Acemoglu 
and Autor 2011), the UK (Goos and Manning 2007), West-Germany (Spitz-Oener 2006; 
Dustmann,  Ludsteck  and  Schönberg  2009)  and  across  European  countries  (Goos, 
Manning and Salomons 2009; Michaels, Natraj and Van Reenen 2010). 
  Secondly, views about the likely impact of globalization on employment in OECD 
economies have also been changing. The concern in the 1980s and 1990s was largely 
about the displacement of manufacturing as a whole (i.e. as an industry) to lower-wage 
countries. More recently, the focus of concern has been about the relocation of certain 
parts of the production process (usually specific occupations, often those involved in 
the  production  of  services)  to  developing  countries,  a  process  known  as  offshoring 
(Feenstra  and  Hanson  1999;  Grossman  and  Rossi-Hansberg  2008;  Rodriguez-Clare 
and Ramondo 2010; Acemoglu, Gancia and Zilibotti 2010; Acemoglu and Autor 2011).1 
The rapid growth of countries like India and China in recent years has made many feel 
that globalization is having a more powerful effect on the structure of employment 
now than in the 1980s.2 For example, Blinder (2007, 2009) and Blinder and Krueger 
(2009) estimate that approximately 25% of US jobs might become offshorable within 
the next 20 years. However, evidence on the importance of offshoring remains mixed. 
For  instance,  Liu  and  Trefler  (2008)  examine  the  employment  effects  of  service 
offshoring by US companies to unaffiliated firms abroad as well as the employment 
effects  of  service  inshoring  (the  sale  of  services  to  US  firms  by  unaffiliated  firms 
                                                
1 Throughout this paper, by “offshoring” we mean the use of intermediate inputs imported from abroad, also 
known  as  “offshore  outsourcing”.  This  is  different  from  “outsourcing”  or  the  use  of  intermediate  inputs 
imported  from  abroad  or  produced  domestically.  The  difference  between  offshoring  and  outsourcing  is 
important here since our model and data only capture the offshore component of outsourcing. 
2 For example, the issue of offshoring of US jobs has become a major political issue - see the accounts in 
Blinder (2006, 2007, 2009) and Mankiw and Swagel (2006).   4 
abroad)  and  find  only  small  positive  effects  of  service  inshoring  and  even  smaller 
negative effects of service offshoring. 
  Although  there  is  broad  agreement  that,  in  very  general  terms,  technology, 
globalization  and  institutions  are  the  most  important  drivers  of  the  changing 
occupational structure of employment, quantifying the effects in empirical work is not 
straightforward because general equilibrium effects are likely to be very important and 
cannot  be  ignored.  A  simple  example,  inspired  by  one  of  the  popular  works  of 
Krugman (1999) (though none the worse for that) will illustrate.  A hamburger requires 
one bun and one patty. Suppose there is an improvement in the technology of patty-
making so that one now only needs half the number of workers to produce one patty. 
This change obviously only directly affects patty-making so a simple-minded approach 
would choose an empirical specification in which the technical change  variable only 
appears  in  the  equation  for  the  number  of  patty-makers.  But,  if  the  empirical 
specification assumes that the technical change does not affect the employment of the 
bun-makers and the number of buns and patties must remain in the same proportion, 
the only possible conclusion is that the innovation reduces the employment of patty-
makers and employment overall. Non-economists only often see this direct effect and 
Krugman’s point is that this is a serious mistake. 
  The  innovation  reduces  the  cost  of  producing  patties  and,  hence,  the  cost  of 
producing hamburgers. This leads to a reduction in the price of hamburgers causing 
an increase in the demand for them (assuming they are non-Giffen). The employment 
of the bun-makers then rises and the employment of the patty-makers is higher than 
one would predict if one assumed the production of hamburgers remained constant 
but not necessarily so large as to prevent an overall fall in employment. Employment in 
bun-making is affected by innovation in patty-making and we have a clear idea of the 
channel  –  through  changes  in  product  demand  induced  by  changes  in  costs  and   5 
prices.3 None of these ideas are new – they date back to at least the work of Baumol 
(1967).4 
  But this is not the end. Because hamburgers are now cheaper there is an income 
and substitution effect on the demand for other consumer products too. If preferences 
are non-homothetic induced changes in the level and distribution of income will also 
induce  changes  in  the  occupational  structure  of  employment.  For  example,  Clark 
(1957) argued that the income elasticity of demand for services is greater than unity, 
in  which  case  a  rise  in real  income  will  tend  to  shift  employment  towards  service-
intense occupations.5 
  The bottom line from this is that if one wants an adequate understanding of the 
changing  occupational  structure  of  employment,  it  is  impossible  to  ignore  general 
equilibrium effects by which a change affecting the demand for one type of labor is 
likely to spill-over to every other type of labor. In empirical modeling one could take a 
non-theoretical approach to quantifying these general equilibrium effects and adopt 
an empirical specification in which every change potentially affects every occupation. 
However, there are likely to be serious identification issues with such an approach and 
it  is  extremely  profligate  with  degrees  of  freedom,  likely  leading  to  very  imprecise 
estimates.  The  alternative  –  and  the  approach  we  take  in  this  paper  –  is  to  use  a 
theoretical  model  of  the  demand  for  labor  to  put  more  structure  on  the  linkages 
between  the  demand  for  different  sorts  of  labor.  We  do  not  think  much  is  lost  in 
imposing this structure as we do have a fairly clear idea of the channels that link the 
demands for different types of labor. In the hamburger example, the demand for bun-
                                                
3 The example assumes two input factors that are perfect complements (buns and patties) and one output 
good (hamburgers). In general, the effects of innovation on factor demands will depend on the degree of 
substitutability between factors in production as well as the degree of substitutability between goods in 
consumption. 
4 It is worth noting that there has been a renewed interest in equilibrium models of unbalanced productivity 
growth across tasks or sectors. See Ngai and Pissarides (2007), Weiss (2008), Reshef (2009) and Autor and 
Dorn (2010). 
5 More recent examples of models assuming different income elasticities for different goods or services 
yielding structural change are Echevarria (1997), Laitner (2000), Caselli and Coleman II (2001), Gollin, 
Parente and Rogerson (2002).   6 
makers only rises to the extent to which the demand for hamburgers rises and this 
occurs because the cost of making hamburgers has fallen. 
  So,  the  first  main  contribution  of  this  paper  is  to  use  a  simple  theoretical 
framework (that has clear antecedents in papers like Katz and Murphy 1992; Card and 
Lemieux  2001)  to  develop  estimable  equations  that  can  be  used  to  identify  and 
quantify all of the channels discussed above. Ours is not the only paper to write down 
a theoretical model to inform thinking (e.g. Autor and Dorn 2010; Acemoglu and Autor 
2011) but there is a tighter link between our theory and empirical specification.    
  Our second main contribution is that we use data from 16 European countries to 
demonstrate that job polarization is pervasive. Most other studies use data from only 
one country, a notable exception being Michaels, Natraj and van Reenen (2010) who 
investigate the impact of ICT on the changing educational composition of employment. 
Using data from multiple countries gives us more ability to investigate the potential 
role  of  labor  market  institutions,  and  more  data  to  investigate  the  importance  of 
technology and globalization, whose effects one would expect to be pervasive on our 
sample of countries.   
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and shows how the 
employment structure in 16 European countries is polarizing. Section 3 then presents 
our simple theoretical framework of the demand for occupations within industries to 
organize our thoughts about how the hypotheses outlined above affect the demand for 
labor. The fourth section describes the variables we use to capture these hypotheses. 
In the fifth section we estimate this model of within-industry changes in occupational 
labor demand across countries. The sixth section then seeks to move beyond within-
industry equations to consider the importance of changes in relative product demand 
through  the  introduction  and  estimation  of  product  demand  curves.  Finally,  the 
seventh section evaluates to what extent job polarization can be explained by each of 
these different channels affecting labor demand. Our main conclusion is that the ALM 
routinization  hypothesis  has  the  most  explanatory  power  for  understanding  job 
polarization  in  Europe,  but  offshoring  does  play  a  role.  We  find  some  role  for  the   7 
importance of changes in relative output prices following technological progress and 
globalization  whereas  income  and  institutional  effects  are  found  to  be  relatively 
unimportant in explaining job polarization in Europe. 
   
2  2  2  2         A PICTURE OF CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN JOB STRUCTURE A PICTURE OF CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN JOB STRUCTURE A PICTURE OF CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN JOB STRUCTURE A PICTURE OF CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN JOB STRUCTURE 
       
        2.A 2.A 2.A 2.A        Employment data Employment data Employment data Employment data6       
   
  In this paper we model employment by industry and occupation. Our main data 
source for employment is the harmonized individual-level European Union Labor Force 
Survey (ELFS) for the period 1993-2006. The ELFS contains data on employment status, 
weekly hours worked, 2-digit International Standard Occupational Classification (ISCO) 
codes and 1-digit industry codes from the Classification of Economic Activities in the 
European Community (NACE revision 1). Throughout this paper, we use weekly hours 
worked as a measure for employment, although our results are not affected by using 
persons employed instead. 
  Out  of  the  28  countries  available  in  the  ELFS,  we  exclude  9  new  EU  member 
countries7,  2  candidate  member  countries8  and  Iceland  because  of  limited  data 
availability. We also discarded Germany from the ELFS because of its too small sample 
size  and  limited  time  span  and  replaced  it  with  data  from  the  German  Federal 
Employment  Agency’s  IABS  dataset9.  Data  for  the  remaining  15  European  countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
                                                
6 See Appendix A for details. 
7 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia 
8 Romania and Bulgaria 
9 The IABS dataset is a 2% random sample of German social security records for the period 1993-2002. For 
each individual it contains data on occupation and industry, as well as several demographic characteristics 
(among others, region of work, full-time or part-time work). We drop workers who are not legally obliged to 
make social security contributions (some 9% of all observations) because for them the IABS is not a random 
sample.  Lacking  a  measure  of  hours  worked, we  use time-varying  information  on  average  weekly  hours 
worked for full-time and part-time workers in both East- and West-Germany, obtained from the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions to proxy for total hours worked in IABS 
occupation-industry-year cells (though our results are robust to restricting the sample to full-time workers). 
We then manually convert the German occupation and industry codings to match ISCO and NACE in the ELFS.   8 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) is used in the 
analysis.  
  We  drop  some  occupations  and  industries  from  the  sample  –  those  related  to 
agriculture  and  fishing  because  they  do  not  consistently  appear  in  the  data  and 
because OECD STAN industry output data is not suited for comparison across countries 
for these sectors (see Section 5.B for details); and those related to the public sector 
(public administration and education) both because our model is better-suited as a 
model of the private sector and because German civil servants are not liable to social 
security and therefore not included in the IABS, and because OECD STAN net operating 
surplus data is not reliable for these two sectors. Our results are never driven by the 
exclusion of these occupations and industries. 
 
        2.B Data summary 2.B Data summary 2.B Data summary 2.B Data summary       
   
  To provide a snapshot of changes in the European job structure, Table 1 shows the 
employment shares of occupations and their percentage point changes between 1993 
and  2006  after  pooling  employment  for  each  occupation  across  our  16  European 
countries.10  This  table  shows  that  the  high-paying  managerial  (ISCO  12,  13), 
professional (ISCO 21 to 24) and associate professional (ISCO 31 to 34) occupations 
experienced the fastest increases in their employment shares. On the other hand, the 
employment shares of some clerks (ISCO 41, which are office clerks; but not ISCO 42, 
which are customer service clerks), craft and related trades workers (ISCO 71 to 74) 
and plant and machine operators and assemblers (ISCO 81 to 83), which pay around 
the mean occupational wage, have declined. Similar to patterns found for the US and 
UK, there has been an increase in the employment shares for some low-paid service 
workers  (ISCO  51,  of  which  the  main  task  consists  of  providing  services  related  to 
travel, catering and personal care; but not ISCO 52, of which the main task consists of 
                                                
10 Since all countries do not have data for the entire time-span of 1993-2006, we calculate average annual 
changes for each country and use these to impute the employment shares in 1993 and/or 2006 where they 
are not available.   9 
selling goods in shops or at markets) and low-paid elementary occupations (ISCO 91, 
which  are  service  elementary  workers  including  cleaners,  domestic  helpers, 
doorkeepers, porters, security personnel and garbage collectors; and ISCO 93, which 
mainly includes low-educated laborers in manufacturing performing simple tasks that 
require  the  use  of  hand-held  tools  and  often  some  physical  effort).  This  is  an 
indication that the existing evidence to date that there is job polarization in the US, UK 
or Germany is not an exception but rather the rule. Pooling our 16 European countries 
together, there is job polarization occurring in which employment rises fastest for the 
best-paying jobs and falls most for those in the middle of the earnings distribution.  
  One might be concerned that 1993 is a recession and 2006 a boom so that the 
changes in Table 1 are cyclical not trends. To examine this, for each country in each 
year, we group the occupations listed in Table 1 into three groups: the four lowest paid 
occupations  (service  and  elementary  occupations),  nine  middling  occupations  (craft 
and related trade workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers) and the eight 
highest  paying  occupations  (managers,  professionals  and  associate  professionals). 
Figure 1 then plots the cumulative percentage change in employment for the group of 
highest-paid and lowest-paid occupations relative to middling occupations averaged 
across countries. If polarization exists and is invariant to the business cycle we would 
expect to see two time series with positive constant slopes. Figure 1 shows that the 
time  series  are  primarily  trends  and  that  the  polarization  found  in  Table  1  is  not 
sensitive to endpoints.  
  Figure 2 further illustrates this process by plotting a fitted kernel regression line of 
the percentage point change in occupation-industry employment shares pooled across 
the  European  countries  against  1994  UK  mean  earnings  at  the  occupation-industry 
level.11 We see a U-shaped relationship, indicating relatively faster employment growth 
in high paying and some low paying jobs. At the European level, job polarization does 
seem to have occurred over our sample period. 
                                                
11 We use the UK occupation-industry wage (from the UK LFS) since there is no European-wide equivalent 
available. Results should not be affected given the high correlation of wage ranks across countries and time 
as we explain in Section 4.C.   10 
  There  may,  of  course,  be  heterogeneity  across  countries  in  the  extent  of 
polarization. Table 2 groups the occupations listed in Table 1 into three groups – just 
as we did for Figure 1. We then compute the percentage point change in employment 
share  for  each  of  these  groups  in  each  country  between  1993  and  2006.  Table  2 
confirms that employment polarization is pervasive across European countries – the 
share of high-paying occupations increases relative to the middling occupations in all 
countries but Portugal, and the share of low-paying occupations increases relative to 
the middling occupations in all countries.12,13 
  As  outlined  in  the  introduction,  there  are  a  number  of  possible  hypotheses  – 
technological progress, globalization and induced effects operating through changes 
in product demand – that can explain these changes and the next section outlines a 
simple  theoretical  framework  to  help  us  to  understand  and  estimate  the  relative 
importance of these factors. 
 
3. 3. 3. 3.        A SIMPLE MODEL OF WITHIN A SIMPLE MODEL OF WITHIN A SIMPLE MODEL OF WITHIN A SIMPLE MODEL OF WITHIN- - - -INDUSTRY DEMANDS FOR OCCUPATIONS INDUSTRY DEMANDS FOR OCCUPATIONS INDUSTRY DEMANDS FOR OCCUPATIONS INDUSTRY DEMANDS FOR OCCUPATIONS 
 
  Our ultimate aim is to explain the changes in the aggregate occupational structure 
of employment documented in the previous section. In order to do this we first develop 
a model of the within-industry occupational structure of employment conditional on 
industry output and then seek to model (in section 6) the demand for industry output. 
Our reason for doing this is that looking within industries gives us a cleaner estimate 
of the effect of technology and globalization on labor demand, while taking account of 
shifts in industry demand then allows us to evaluate product demand effects.  
       
        3.A The production of goods and the demand for tasks 3.A The production of goods and the demand for tasks 3.A The production of goods and the demand for tasks 3.A The production of goods and the demand for tasks       
   
                                                
12 This result is upheld when we add customer service clerks, a middle-paid service occupation, to the four 
lowest-paid occupations: indeed, in this case, we observe an increase in the share of high- and low-paying 
occupations relative to the middling occupations in all countries, i.e. including Portugal. 
13 Acemoglu and Autor (2011) argue that the numbers in Table 2 show that job polarization is at least as 
pronounced in our sample of European countries as in the United States.   11 
  Industry-level production function 
  Assume  that  output  in  all industries  is produced  by combining certain common 
building blocks that  we will call tasks. Some industries are more intensive users of 
some tasks than others. In  particular, assume the following production function for 
industry i using tasks  1 2 , ,..., J T T T  as inputs: 
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where  j c is  the  real  unit  cost  of  using  task  j  (derived  below)  and  i G   real  industry 
marginal cost that is given by:  















    G =      
     
∑                                                             (3) 
It should be noted that in the empirical work that follows we also have country and 
time subscripts but we ignore these for the moment to avoid excessive notation.        
   
  Task-level production function 
  We assume that output of task j can be produced using labor of one occupation 
and some other inputs. For convenience we will subscript the type of labor used in 
producing task j output by j, so that tasks and occupations are equated. In particular, 
assume that in industry i tasks are produced using domestic labor of occupation j,  ij N , 
and any other input,  ij K , according to: 
         ( ) ( )
1
( , ) ij ij ij Nj ij Kj ij T N K N K
r r r a a   = +    
 with  1 r <                                               (4)   12 
where we are making the assumption that the technology to produce task j is common 
across industries so the i subscript only appears on the input factors. This is a strong 
assumption  (though  it  has  been  used  in  other  models  e.g.  Grossman  and  Rossi-
Hansberg  2008)14  which  we do seek  to test later. In this specification  the  input ij K  
should be interpreted very generally to mean all other inputs that are not domestic 
employment  (e.g.  it  could  be  capital  or  offshored  overseas  employment  to  capture 
globalization) – we proceed assuming these other inputs are one-dimensional but that 
is just for simplicity and explicitly accounting for multiple inputs only adds algebraic 
complication. 
  This  type  of  two-stage  set-up  for  modeling  the  production  process  is 
increasingly  standard  in  the  literature,  although  different  papers  make  somewhat 
different  assumptions.  Autor  and  Dorn  (2010)  have  two  industries  (goods  and 
services),  three  occupations  (routine,  abstract  and  manual)  and  assume  the  goods 
industry  production  function  uses  abstract  and  routine  labor  and  capital  and  the 
services sector uses only manual labor. Those assumptions fit within our set-up. In 
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) the single final good is produced from ‘tasks’ that can be 
produced  by  different  types  of  labor  and  capital  though  with  different  relative 
efficiencies. Their set-up is close to ours if one interprets what they call ‘tasks’ as our 
industries. 
  The associated demand for labor of type j conditional on task output is given by: 
         
1
1
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14 Though they assume that domestic and foreign labor are perfect substitutes.   13 
where  j w  is the real wage in occupation j and  j r  the real price of the other input used 
in the production of task j and where the cost of producing one unit of task j is given 
by:  
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with  | N j k  the share of domestic labor in the total costs of producing task j. The final 
expression  in  (6)  is  an  approximation  if  the  task-level  production  function  is  not 
Cobb-Douglas but is useful for producing log-linear estimating equations. 
   
        3.B The conditional demand for labor 3.B The conditional demand for labor 3.B The conditional demand for labor 3.B The conditional demand for labor       
   
  Combining  equations  (2)  through  (6)  and  taking  logs  leads  to  the  following 
expression for the demand for labor conditional on industry output: 
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We will use this framework to capture different influences on labor demand. Note that 
changes affecting the task-level production function for a single occupation will also 
affect the conditional labor demand curve for other occupations through the industry 
marginal cost term in (7), with the size of the effect depending on the elasticity of 
substitution between tasks. 
  In our framework technology can affect the demand for labor by working either at 
the level of the industry production function (1) – that is, changes in ij b  – or the task-
level production function (4) allowing for task-biased technological progress – that is, 
occupation specific trend changes in  ( ) , Nj Kj a a . Offshoring can be thought to affect 
the demand for occupations through an occupation specific gradual decline in the cost   14 
of foreign inputs (i.e.  j r ) other than domestic labor – though one could also model it 
through an effect on technology.  
  In  section  5  we  seek  to  estimate  the  conditional  labor  demand  curve  of  (7).  In 
principle,  most  of  the  parameters  in  equation  (7)  could  vary  at  all  levels  of  our 
observations  (industry-occupation-country-year),  rendering  our  model  unidentified. 
So, it is helpful to outline the identifying assumptions that we are going to make in our 
baseline specification. 
  First,  we  will  assume  that  all  technological  progress  and  offshoring  can  be 
modeled, without loss of generality, as affecting the task-level production function (4) 
and  not  the  industry-level  production  function  (1).  Because  task-level  output  is  a 
construct and not an observable, what this assumption really means is that there is 
only  an  occupation  specific  and  no  industry-occupation  specific  component  to 
technological  change  or  globalization  so  that  if  one  did  incorporate  technological 
change into the industry-level production function (1), one could re-define the task 
output so that all technological change appeared in the task-level production function 
(4).  
  Secondly, we will assume that the impact of technology and offshoring is the same 
for all countries, an assumption that seems reasonable given that they are at a similar 
level of economic development and, being members of the EU, face the same trade 
regime. 
  We also make a number of simplifications. We assume that the occupational wage,
j w ,  can  vary  across  country  and  years  but  that  any  industry  effect  on  wages  is 
constant.  The  reason  is  that  wage  measures  can  be  constructed  for  occupation-
country-year cells but not occupation-industry-country-year combinations in our data 
(see Section 4.C for details). We also assume that  N j k  can reasonably be approximated 
by a constant. 
  Introducing country (c)  and year (t)  subscripts, this  gives  us an equation of  the 
following form:
     15 
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Because  we  have  over-identification,  we  can  and  do  some  investigation  of 
heterogeneity at country and industry level in what follows. But, we are unable to allow 
saturated variation.   
 
  3.C Testing the assumptions of the model 3.C Testing the assumptions of the model 3.C Testing the assumptions of the model 3.C Testing the assumptions of the model       
   
  One way of testing for the adequacy of equation (8) as a basic description of the 
data is to estimate ANOVA models. To see how this can help note that the first two 
terms in equation (8) are industry-country-time effects, the third term is an industry-
occupation effect, the wage is an occupation-country-year effect and the technology 
and globalization variables are occupation-year effects.  
  Column 1 of Table 3 presents ANOVA F-test statistics (with p-values in brackets) 
for this model.15 As we would expect from equation (8), F-test statistics are significant 
for industry-country-year, industry-occupation and occupation-year effects. If there is 
a country-specific component to task-biased technical change or offshoring, we would 
expect to see that occupation-country-year effects have significant extra explanatory 
power – the F-test statistic of 0.93 with a p-value of 1 in column 1 of Table 3 shows 
they do not. It should be noted that in our model wages are allowed to vary at the 
country-occupation-year level and the finding that such effects are not very significant 
suggests that either country-specific changes in relative occupational wages are not 
very important (i.e. there is little change in wage inequality in most countries in our 
sample period so that differences in relative wages across countries are approximately 
                                                
15 Note that because each ANOVA also includes industry, occupation, country, year and occupation-country 
controls, all the interactions listed in the table are exactly identified except for the term industry-country-
year which additionally contains industry-country, industry-year and country-year variation. For instance, 
because the ANOVA controls for occupation and year effects separately, the F-test statistic on occupation-
year only tests for the significance of occupation-year specific variation.   16 
constant)  or  that  the  occupational  wage  is  not  very  important.  The  significance  of 
occupation-year  effects  suggests  pervasive  effects  across  countries  and  industries, 
which  indicates  scope  for the  importance  of factors  that  vary at this level, such as 
task-biased technological change and offshoring. 
  Now  consider  how  we  can  use  this  set-up  to  further  test  our  identifying 
assumptions. The variation in employment that remains unaccounted for in column 1 
of  Table  3  is  industry-occupation-year,  industry-occupation-country  or  industry-
occupation-country-year  specific. Column 2 of  Table  3  therefore adds an  industry-
occupation-year effect. This effect does not have significant explanatory power, which 
is  inconsistent  with  task-biased  technological  change  or  offshoring  having  an 
industry-occupation specific component.  
  Finally, the third column of Table 3 adds an industry-occupation-country instead 
of an industry-occupation-year effect to the ANOVA. The F-test statistic of 15.39 is 
statistically  significant.  One  possible  explanation  could  be  that  the  technology  to 
combine tasks in production varies across countries (that is,  ij b  varies with country but 
not time). Our preferred interpretation for the significance of the industry-occupation-
country effect is that our industries and occupations are quite aggregated and that the 
product mix within aggregate industry groups differs across countries. If, for example, 
the single industry “manufacturing” that we observe in our data in one country mainly 
consists of the manufacture of textiles and in another country mainly consists of the 
manufacture  of  chemical  products,  one  would  expect  to  see  significant  industry-
occupation-country  variation  in  employment  even  if  countries  use  the  same 
technologies.16 To account for this, the regression results presented below will control 
for industry-occupation-country fixed effects rather than only an industry-occupation 
fixed effect. Finally note from column 3 of Table 3 that the inclusion of an industry-
occupation-country  effect  increases  the  F-test  statistic  for  the  occupation-country-
year  interaction,  which  –  although  it  remains relatively  small – becomes statistically 
                                                
16 Appendix B shows that much of the significance of the industry-occupation-country interaction is indeed 
due  to  differences  between  countries  in  the  composition  of  more  disaggregated  industries  within  our 
industry classification.   17 
significant.  Also  note  from  column  4  of  Table  3  that  the  inclusion  of  an  industry-
occupation-country effect  increases  the F-test  statistic on  the industry-occupation-
year interaction slightly.17  
  Of course, this ANOVA does not tell us anything about the importance of these 
different potential factors: to do that we need to have variables to capture the effects 
of  task-biased  technological  progress  and  offshoring.  How  we  construct  those 
variables is the subject of the next section. 
  
4. 4. 4. 4.        DATA ON TECHNOLOGY, GLOBALIZATION AND WAGES DATA ON TECHNOLOGY, GLOBALIZATION AND WAGES DATA ON TECHNOLOGY, GLOBALIZATION AND WAGES DATA ON TECHNOLOGY, GLOBALIZATION AND WAGES       
         
  In  this  section  we  describe  our  main  sources  of  our  measures  of  technological 
change, offshoring and wages at the level of occupations. 
 
        4.A Technology 4.A Technology 4.A Technology 4.A Technology18 
   
  The technology measures we use do not have country or time variation. The lack of 
country variation is probably not a problem as we believe technological change to be 
similar in all the countries in our sample. To capture the idea that technology changes 
over time, we interact our technology variables with linear time trends.19 This assumes 
that,  for  example,  occupations  that  are  intensive  in  routine  tasks  have  been  more 
affected by technological change that makes replacing human routine labor easier.20 
                                                
17 It is not computationally possible to add industry-occupation-country together with both occupation-
country-year  as  well  as  industry-occupation-year  effects to the  ANOVA  using  our  full  sample.  However, 
dividing  the  sample  into  two  subsamples  of  countries  and  decomposing  the  variation  in  employment 
accounting for all possible dimensions simultaneously gives qualitatively identical results. 
18 See Appendix C for details. 
19 Note that we cannot, nor do we need to, identify whether technical change in the task-level production 
functions is labor- or capital-augmenting: we are only interested in the total effect on the demand for labor. 
20  There  is  no  time  variation  in  ONET,  which  would  be  problematic  for  the  analysis  below  if  the  task 
composition  within  occupations  is  changing  over  time.  However,  using  similar  DOT  measures  across  US 
occupations and over time, Goos and Manning (2007) find that most of the overall changes in mean task 
measures happened between and not within occupations. Also note that ONET does not contain any variation 
in job task measures within occupations. However, Autor and Handel (2009) use the individual level PDII 
(Princeton  Data  Improvement  Initiative)  data  to  show  that  occupation  is  the  dominant  predictor  for  the 
variation in the task measures that are also used in this paper.   18 
  To measure the type of work done in occupations, we use data from the December 
2006  version  of  the  Occupational  Information  Network  (ONET)  database.  ONET  is  a 
primary  source  of  occupational  information,  providing  comprehensive  data  on  key 
attributes and characteristics of workers in US occupations. It is a replacement for the 
Dictionary  of  Occupational  Titles  (DOT)  which  has  been  used  in  earlier  research, 
notably by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003). ONET data comes from job incumbents, 
occupational analysts and occupational experts and is collected for 812 occupations 
which  are  based  on  the  2000  Standard  Occupational  Code  (SOC).  We  manually 
converted the 2000 Standard Occupational Code (SOC) used in the ONET data to ISCO.  
  One part of ONET consists of some 100 variables related to worker characteristics, 
worker requirements and general work activities. We select 96 of these task measures 
which  are  closest  to  the  DOT  task  requirements  used  by  Autor,  Levy  and  Murnane 
(2003) and Autor and Dorn (2010). Each respondent is asked how important the task is 
for her job,  where importance ranges from 1  (not important  at  all)  to  5  (extremely 
important).  Each of  the  96 ONET variables is  categorized  into  one of  three groups: 
Abstract, Routine or Service.21  
  We  choose  these  three  measures  following  Autor  and  Dorn  (2010)  to  capture 
technological progress biased towards occupations intense in non-routine tasks – the 
ALM hypothesis. Routine tasks are those which computers can perform with relative 
ease, such as jobs that require the input of repetitive physical strength or motion, as 
well as jobs  requiring  repetitive and  non-complex cognitive  skills. The  non-routine 
dimension is split up into Abstract and Service to capture the different skill content of 
these  non-routine tasks: examples of Abstract tasks are “complex problem solving” 
(e.g.  needed  by  engineers  and  medical  doctors)  and  Service  tasks  are  “caring  for 
others”  (e.g.  needed  by  hairdressers  and  medical  doctors),  respectively.  Although 
Abstract tasks are non-routine tasks mainly carried out by highly educated workers, 
                                                
21 Appendix C provides robustness checks where the task dimensions are determined by means of principal 
component analysis rather than by manual assignment.   19 
Service  tasks  are  non-routine  tasks  that  workers  with  lower  levels  of  education 
commonly perform.  
  Examples  of  ONET  variables  used  as  measures  of  Abstract  tasks  are  “critical 
thinking”,  “judgment  and  decision  making”,  “complex  problem  solving”,  “interacting 
with  computers”  and  “thinking  creatively”.  Examples  of  Routine  task  measures  are 
“arm-hand steadiness”, “manual dexterity”, “finger dexterity”, “operation monitoring”, 
and “estimating the quantifiable characteristics of products, events, or information”. 
Examples of Service task measures are “social perceptiveness”, “service orientation”, 
“assisting  and  caring  for  others”,  “establishing  and  maintaining  interpersonal 
relationships”, “selling”, and “performing for or working directly with the public”. 
  For  each  of  these  three  task  measures,  we  calculate  an  average  across  SOC 
occupations, which we collapse to the ISCO level weighted by US employment in each 
SOC cell taken from ONET. Columns 1 through 3 of Table 4 show the values of these 
three principal components, with mean zero and unit standard deviation, for 2-digit 
ISCO occupations ranked by their mean 1993 wage across the 16 European countries. 
Following Autor and Dorn (2010), column 4 of Table 4 summarizes the information in 
columns 1-3 by constructing a one dimensional Routine Task Index (RTI), defined as 
routine task importance divided by the sum of abstract and service task importances 
and standardized to have unit standard deviation and mean zero.  
  Columns  1 to 3 of Table 4 allow us to categorize occupations into three broad 
groups. Firstly, some occupations are highly routine and relatively low in abstract and 
service  task  importance  (craft  and  related  trade  workers  (ISCO  71-74);  plant  and 
machine operators and assemblers (ISCO 81-83)). Secondly, some occupations are low 
in  routine  task  importance  and  high  in  both  abstract  and  service  task  importance 
(managers  (ISCO  12,13);  professionals  (ISCO  21-24);  furthermore,  technicians  and 
associate  professionals  (ISCO  31-34)  generally  consist  of  doing  fewer  abstract  and 
service and more routine tasks relative to the corresponding professional occupations 
(ISCO 21-24)). Thirdly, some occupations are low in routine and abstract but high in 
service task importance (clerks (ISCO 41,42) although customer service clerks (ISCO   20 
42) are much more service orientated compared to office clerks (ISCO 41); low-paid 
service workers (ISCO 51,52); low-paid elementary occupations (ISCO 91,93) although 
these  occupations  are  relatively  low  in  service  importance  compared  to  low-paid 
service workers).  
  Finally,  to  capture  the  idea  of  skill-biased  technical  change  or  SBTC,  the  sixth 
column of Table 4 also presents the mean educational attainment by occupation. This 
variable  derives  from  a  three-level  education  variable  (categorized  with  the 
International Standard Classification of Education, ISCED) available in the ELFS, which 
we average by occupation across countries.22  
   
        4.B Offshoring 4.B Offshoring 4.B Offshoring 4.B Offshoring23       
   
  There are a number of existing approaches to measuring the impact of offshoring 
on the labor market. Typically, use is made of measures of foreign direct investment by 
OECD countries or measures of imports in total GDP; the share of intermediate goods 
imports in total imports; or the share of imports from non-OECD countries in total 
imports. This type of data is available at the country-industry-time level but never at 
the occupation level.  
  One exception is a recent study by Blinder and Krueger (2009) who use Princeton 
Data Improvement Initiative data to construct various measures of offshorability. The 
authors conclude that their preferred measure is constructed by professional coders 
based on a worker’s occupational classification. In contrast, our measure is derived 
from data on actual offshoring, but it is reassuring to see that it corresponds closely to 
the preferred measure by Blinder and Krueger (2009). 
  We  obtain  a  measure  of  offshorability  from  the  European  Restructuring  Monitor 
(ERM)  of  the  European  Monitoring  Centre  on  Change  (EMCC),  which  is  a  part  of 
                                                
22  Occupational  education  levels  are  very  highly  correlated  among  countries,  the  average  correlation 
coefficient being 0.93 with a standard deviation of 0.03 (the average Spearman rank correlation coefficient is 
0.86). 
23 See Appendix D for details.   21 
Eurofound.  ERM  is  available  online24  and  provides  summaries  of  news  reports  (so-
called  fact  sheets)  since  2002  about  companies  located  in  Europe  that  announce 
offshoring  plans.  These  fact  sheets  contain  information  on  the  company  that  is 
offshoring part(s) of its production process, such as the country and the industry in 
which it operates, how many workers are employed nationwide or in that particular 
location,  how  many  jobs  are  being  offshored  and  to  which  country,  and,  most 
importantly for our purposes, what kinds of jobs (i.e. which occupations) are being 
offshored.  
  We process 415 fact sheets (covering May 31st, 2002 up to June 30th, 2008), or 
cases of offshoring, to construct an index of how offshorable the different occupations 
are. We sum the number of cases for each ISCO occupation25, and generate a rank by 
rescaling the number of cases across occupations to a distribution with mean zero and 
unit  standard  deviation.  The  fifth  column  of  Table  4  shows  this  occupation-level 
measure of offshorability. It can be seen from Table 4 that some occupations that are 
high in routine task importance and low in abstract and service task importance are 
offshored most often (metal, machinery and related trade workers (ISCO 72); plant and 
machine operators and assemblers (ISCO 81,82)). However, Table 4 also shows that 
other occupations in the same major groups are much less offshorable (construction 
workers (ISCO 71); precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trade workers (ISCO 
73,74);  drivers  (ISCO  83)).  Similarly,  some  occupations  low  in  routine  but  high  in 
abstract or service task importance (physical, mathematical and engineering (associate) 
professionals  (ISCO  21,31);  other  associate  professionals  which  includes  call-centre 
workers (ISCO 34); office clerks (ISCO 41); low-educated elementary workers mainly in 
manufacturing (ISCO 93)) are still much more offshorable than others (managers (ISCO 
12,13), life science and health (associate) professionals (ISCO 22,32); customer service 
clerks  (ISCO  42);  low-paid  service  (elementary)  workers  (ISCO  51,52,91)).  This  all 
seems sensible. 
                                                
24 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emcc/index.htm 
25 Note that one fact sheet often contains more than one ISCO occupation that is being offshored.   22 
       
        4.C Wages 4.C Wages 4.C Wages 4.C Wages26       
   
  Since the ELFS does not contain any earnings information, we obtain time-varying 
country-specific occupational wages from the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP) and European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The 
ECHP contains gross monthly wages for the period 1994-2001, whereas the EU-SILC 
reports gross monthly wages for the period 2004-2006. For the UK, we use the gross 
weekly  wage  from  the  Labor  Force  Survey  (UK  LFS)  because  it  contains  many  more 
observations and is available for 1993-2006. All wages have been converted into 2000 
Euros using harmonized price indices and real exchange rates. 
  To match our employment dataset, we construct an occupational wage measure 
weighted  by  hours  worked.  Because  sample  sizes  in  the  ECHP  and  EU-SILC  are 
relatively small and certainly too small to obtain reliable industry-occupation means in 
each  country  and  year,  we  smooth  wages  by  pooling  together  all  years  for  each 
occupation and estimating a model in which the dummy on occupation varies smoothly 
with a quadratic time trend. We also use this procedure to impute wages for years that 
are missing. 
  Given the less than perfect nature of the wage data, it is reassuring that the wage 
rank of occupations is intuitive, and highly and significantly correlated within countries 
over time. Table 5 provides the wage rank of occupations in 1993 and 2006, averaged 
across the 16 countries and rescaled to mean zero and unit standard deviation. The 
ranking is as expected, with managers and professionals being the most highly paid, 
service  workers  and  workers  in  elementary  occupations  the  lowest  paid,  and 
manufacturing and office workers somewhere in between. This ranking is very stable 
within countries over time, with Spearman rank correlation coefficients of around 0.90, 
and all significant at the 1% level. 
       
                                                
26 The methodology we use to construct occupational wages is described in Appendix E.   23 
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  The starting point for our empirical investigation is equation (8), the demand for 
labor  conditional  on  industry  output.  This  conditional  labor  demand  curve  is  well-
suited to estimating the effect of technology and offshoring on production functions 
i.e. the impact of these variables ignoring product demand effects. In the hamburger 
example from the introduction, the estimation of a conditional labor demand curve 
would tell us that, for given output of hamburgers, there has been no change in the 
employment  of  bun-makers  but  a  fall  in  the  employment  of  patty-makers,  a  true 
indication of where technology has been changing.27 
  To estimate that equation we replace the first two terms by industry-country-year 
dummies and we capture the third term – the ij b  - by including industry-occupation-
country dummies.28 We also include occupation-country-year varying wages. We then 
interact the occupation specific measures of technology and offshoring discussed in 
the previous section with a time trend to capture secular changes. Note that because 
we standardize  each task  measure and  our measure  of offshorability  to have mean 
zero and unit standard deviation across occupations, point estimates are comparable 
between  them.  To  account  for  serial  correlation  across  years,  we  cluster  standard 
errors by industry-occupation-country.  
  The first estimation results are presented in Table 6A. Columns 1 to 3 report point 
estimates  for  each  task  measure  separately  whereas  column  4  adds  them 
simultaneously  to  the  regression.  The  point  estimates  suggest  that  employment 
increases by 1.33% and 1.28% faster annually for occupations one standard deviation 
more  intense  in  abstract  and  service  tasks,  respectively,  whereas  employment  in 
occupations  one  standard  deviation  more  intense  in  routine  tasks  increases  1.33% 
slower  annually.  Although  the  point  estimates  in  column  4  are  generally  smaller  in 
                                                
27 Note that the assumption of perfect complementarity in the hamburger example is not innocuous in that 
the elasticity of substitution between tasks in goods production is assumed to approach zero in (8). 
28 Note that we add industry-occupation-country rather than the industry-occupation dummies. The reason 
for  this  is  the  significance  of  industry-occupation-country  specific  employment  variation  in  our  data 
discussed in Section 3.C. However, adding industry-occupation dummies instead does not affect our results.   24 
absolute value, they have the expected sign and remain highly statistically significant 
for  abstract  and  routine  tasks.  Using  the  one-dimensional  RTI  index,  column  5 
suggests that employment in occupations that are one standard deviation more routine 
has grown 1.52% slower each year.  
  Columns 6 to 11 add the offshorability measure. The estimated coefficients on the 
task measures are very similar to those reported in columns 1 to 5 whereas the impact 
of offshorability is smaller in absolute value and significantly decreases in magnitude 
when  task  measures  –  especially  service  task  importance  or  the  one-dimensional 
measure– are controlled for. In sum, Table 6A suggests that task-biased technological 
progress is an important driver of changes in within-industry demand for occupations. 
There  is  also  evidence  in  support  of  the  hypothesis  that  employment  in  some 
occupations has recently been offshored, although the estimated employment impact 
is smaller and not robust to the controls for technology.  
  We  have until  now ignored the other hypothesis for the impact  of technological 
change on employment: skill-biased technological change. Within the context of our 
model,  SBTC  would  imply  that  tasks  vary  by  the  amount  of  schooling  required  to 
perform  them,  and  that  technology  is  a  better  substitute  for  tasks  the  lower  their 
educational requirement. Productivity would then be predicted to increase over time 
for tasks that can only be performed by highly educated workers. Table 6B therefore 
addresses the SBTC hypothesis by including the occupational education level interacted 
with a linear time trend as a regressor.  
  Column  1  of  Table  6B  shows  that  the  education  level  is  indeed  a  significant 
predictor for employment: on average, occupations that have an education level one 
standard deviation above the mean experience 1.34% higher employment growth per 
annum.  However,  if  SBTC  were  to  be  the  correct  model,  the  task-dimension  of 
employment should disappear once the education level is controlled for, bringing the 
point  estimates  on  abstract,  routine,  and  service  task  importance  (close)  to  zero. 
Column 2 shows that this is clearly not the case. The final column of Table 6B replaces 
the task measures by the RTI index. Although higher-educated occupations on average   25 
increase  their  employment  faster  than  lower-educated  occupations,  the  task 
dimension  of  employment  continues  to  be  a  significant  predictor  of  employment 
changes.  
       
5.A Country and industry heterogeneity 5.A Country and industry heterogeneity 5.A Country and industry heterogeneity 5.A Country and industry heterogeneity 
   
  Until now, we have assumed that technology and offshoring have the same impact 
in all 16 countries and that the effect is the same for all industries. If all countries and 
industries in our sample can be assumed to be equally affected by similar changes in 
the  within-industry  demand  for  occupations,  an  additional  test  would  be  to  see 
whether  point  estimates  do  not  differ  significantly  between  countries  or  industries. 
Table 7 therefore shows F-test statistics (with p-values in brackets) for the interactions 
with country or industry dummies of the technology and offshorability specific time 
trends estimated in columns 10 and 11 of Table 6A. 
  Column 1 of  Table  7 shows that as far as technological  progress is  concerned, 
country heterogeneity only exists for growth in abstract intense occupations – this also 
explains the significance of the country dummy interactions in column 2 where the 
task measures have been replaced by the RTI index. The F-test statistic for the impact 
of  offshoring,  however,  is  statistically  significant  in  both  columns  1  and  2.  This 
suggests  that  the  impact  of  offshoring  is  generally  less  pervasive  compared  to 
technological  progress.29  Columns  3  and  4  of  Table  7  interact  the  technology  and 
offshoring specific time trends with industry instead of country dummies. The reported 
p-values of the F-test statistics show that none of the industry specific time trends are 
different at less than the 5% significance level. In sum, Table 7 shows that the impact 
of task-biased technological progress on the within-industry demand for occupations 
is pervasive across countries and industries and that there is perhaps some modest 
country heterogeneity in the impact of offshoring. 
                                                
29 Appendix F reports the point estimates for all the interactions in Table 7. We were unable to find any 
interesting patterns to the nature of this heterogeneity.   26 
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  The estimates we have reported so far treat industry output and industry marginal 
costs in equation (8) as country-year-industry dummies. That is sufficient if one is just 
interested in estimating the impact of technology and offshoring within industries. But, 
to take our estimates further as we do in the next section, we need to be able to model 
these terms more explicitly. To that end this section reports estimates that replace 
those dummy variables with industry output and industry marginal costs. 
  Measures of industry output and industry marginal costs are taken from the OECD 
STAN  Database  for  Industrial  Analysis.30  Each  of  our  16  countries  except  Ireland  is 
included in STAN. This data covers the period 1993-2006 for all 15 of these countries. 
STAN  uses  an  industry  list  for  all  countries  based  on  the  International  Standard 
Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities, Revision 3 (ISIC Rev.3) which covers 
all activities (including services) and is compatible with NACE revision 1 used in the 
ELFS.31 
  The measure of output used in the analysis below is value added, available in STAN 
as the difference between production (defined as the value of goods and/or services 
produced in a year, whether sold or stocked) and intermediate inputs. Value added 
comprises labor costs, capital costs and net operating surplus. To obtain variation in 
output,  value  added  has  been  deflated  using  industry-country-year  specific  price 
indices available from STAN. Finally, we approximate real industry marginal costs by 
the difference between production and net operating surplus, divided by production. 
This gives an estimate of the real average cost of using labor, capital and intermediate 
                                                
30 See Appendix G for details. 
31 Due to limited data on net operating surplus for the NACE industry “Private households with employed 
persons”, we have one less industry when using STAN data in our regressions. The exceptions are France, 
Portugal, Spain and the UK, where this industry is instead included in “Other community, social and personal 
service  activities”  in  STAN.  Although  the  industry  “Private  households  with  employed  persons”  mainly 
employs low-paid service elementary workers and its employment share has increased from 0.82% in 1993 
to 0.90% in 2006, it is too small to be important.    27 
inputs per Euro of output. This measure can be seen as a proxy for the variation in real 
industry average costs, which in our model is identical to real industry marginal cost. 
  Table 8 uses the specifications in columns 10 and 11 of Table 6A but replaces the 
country-year-industry dummies by country-year specific measures of industry output 
and of industry marginal costs. To account for measurement error in industry output 
over time, columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 show 2SLS estimates using the logarithm of 
industry  gross  capital  stock  (also  taken  from  the  OECD  STAN  Database)  as  an 
instrument for log industry output.32 The point estimates on the technology measures 
are similar in magnitude and significance to those reported in Table 6A whereas the 
point estimates on offshorability are somewhat larger in absolute value and significant 
at the 5% level. In line with the predictions of our model, the coefficient on log industry 
marginal costs is positive and significant. The coefficient on log industry output is 1 
with a standard error of 0.08 confirming the assumption of constant returns to scale in 
(8).33 To check for the robustness of these results in the larger sample of 15 countries, 
columns 3 and 4 estimate (8) using OLS while imposing constant returns to scale by 
constraining  the  coefficient  on  log  industry  output  to  be  unity.  This  does  not 
qualitatively affect the other point estimates. In sum, the results in Table 8 show that 
equation (8) is a reasonable approximation of the employment variation observed in 
our data. 
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  Our estimates so far condition on wages. This is appropriate if one is interested – 
as we have  been - in  estimating labor demand curves, though one should perhaps 
instrument  wages,  a  topic  we  discuss  further  below.  However,  if  labor  supply  to 
particular occupations is not perfectly elastic one would expect that technology and 
                                                
32 This restricts the number of observations because gross capital stock data is not available for a number of 
countries (Austria, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal).  
33 The OLS estimate is 0.44 with a standard error of 0.04.   28 
globalization also affect relative occupational wages and thereby relative occupational 
employment.  
  It is not entirely clear what is the appropriate view to take about the elasticity in the 
supply  of  labor  to  different  occupations.  Studies  that  segment  the  labor  market  by 
education typically assume that the supply of different skills is inelastic in the short-
run  because  individuals  primarily  fix  their  education  level  at  the  beginning  of  their 
working  life.  But,  occupational  mobility  is  higher  than  educational  mobility  (though 
much  more  so  for  those  occupations  without  much  specific  human  capital)  so  we 
would not expect the elasticity in the supply of labor to many occupations to be totally 
inelastic even in the short-run. In the long-run, studies like Goldin and Katz (2008) 
suggest that the supply of labor of different education levels is very elastic and the 
same is probably true of supply to different occupations. 
  Given  these  conceptual  issues,  it  makes  sense  to  look  at  evidence  on  whether 
technology  and  offshoring  seem  to  affect  wages.  Autor,  Katz  and  Kearney  (2008), 
Lemieux  (2008)  and  Autor  and  Dorn  (2010)  find  a  positive  correlation  between 
employment  polarization  and  wage  growth  across  US  occupations.  In  line  with  this 
finding, Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) argue that 
routinization has had non-trivial effects on US wage inequality.  
  However,  the  evidence  is  much  less  clear  for  European  countries.  Dustmann, 
Ludsteck and Schönberg (2009) find that occupational employment and wage growth 
during  the  1990s  in  Germany  are  only  weakly  positively  correlated  across  all 
occupations  and  even  negatively  correlated  across  occupations  paying  below  the 
median. Goos and Manning (2007) report a similar finding for the UK for the period 
1975-99. 
  We investigate the potential endogeneity of wages in our data in a number of ways. 
First, we estimate the specification in columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 while instrumenting 
the  wage  using  demographic  changes  in  labor  supply  as  an  exclusion  restriction 
(Dustmann,  Ludsteck  and  Schönberg  (2009)  suggest  such  supply  changes  might 
explain  the  wage  changes  they  observe  in  Germany).  Specifically,  we  use  as  an   29 
instrument  counterfactual  occupational  employment  only  accounting  for  economy-
wide  changes  in  employment  by  gender-migration  while  keeping  the  occupational 
composition  within  each  gender-migration  combination  constant  over  time.34  The 
results are reported in the first two columns of Table 9. The first-stage coefficients on 
counterfactual labor supply are negative and significant. The estimates of the impact of 
technology and offshorability are also as expected. Note that the coefficient on wages 
is now much larger, perhaps an indication that our wage measure is imperfect so the 
OLS estimates suffer from attenuation bias. 
  Secondly,  we  can  simply  estimate  models  excluding  the  wage  and  possibly 
including counterfactual labor supply which can be thought of – perhaps somewhat 
loosely  –  as  a  reduced  form  specification.  This  does  not  significantly  change  the 
estimated impact of technological change and offshoring either. For example, the last 
two columns of Table 9 exclude wages as well as industry marginal costs and industry 
output – as these are influenced by wages - showing it does not qualitatively affect the 
point estimates on technology and offshoring. 
  In  sum,  the  evidence  suggests  that  relative  occupational  wage  movements  in 
Europe are not strongly correlated with our technology and offshoring variables. This 
result differs from evidence for the US but is not necessarily inconsistent with it since 
many  European  countries  have  institutions  (e.g.  minimum  wages  and  collective 
bargaining) that mute or stop a wage response, especially across middling and lower-
paying occupations. Although it is an interesting question why technological progress 
and globalization do not seem to explain changes in relative occupational wages in 
Europe very well, it does serve our purpose here since all the impact of task-biased 
technological  progress  and  offshoring  can  be  seen  from  changes  in  relative  labor 
demand.35 
 
                                                
34 This restricts the number of observations because migration data is not available for Germany and Italy. 
Note that Ireland is also excluded, due to the lack of OECD STAN data. 
35 This is consistent with Acemoglu and Autor (2011) who argue that employment polarization is at least as 
pronounced in our sample of European countries as in the United States. Also see footnote 13.   30 
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  All our estimates so far have been of the demand for labor of different occupations 
conditional  on  industry  output.  While  that  is  an  interesting  exercise  well-suited  to 
isolating the effects of technology and globalization on production functions, it does 
have limitations when it comes to our ultimate aim – explaining the phenomenon of 
job polarization in the economy as a whole – because, as explained in the introduction, 
it cannot take account of the general equilibrium effects that we know must be very 
important. 
  In  this  section  we  discuss  these  product  demand  effects  in  more  detail.  One 
mechanism is that changes in production functions will shift the pattern of industry 
output through the effect they have on relative industry marginal costs and therefore 
relative output prices. In the hamburger example, the improvement in patty-making 
reduced the price of hamburgers inducing a rise in the demand for bun-makers. More 
generally, routinization will result in larger falls in prices in industries that historically 
used a lot of routine labor, and this will tend to benefit all labor that is used in these 
industries. 
  Another possibility discussed in the introduction is that relative product demand 
shifts  because  preferences  are  non-homothetic.  Models  assuming  different  income 
elasticities for different goods or services yield structural change even if productivity 
growth is balanced across tasks or sectors (Echevarria 1997; Laitner 2000; Caselli and 
Coleman II 2001; Gollin, Parente and Rogerson 2002).36 Non-homothetic preferences 
also imply that changes in the distribution of income will lead to changes in relative 
product demand. A related but distinct hypothesis, proposed by Manning (2004) and 
Mazzolari  and  Ragusa  (2008),  is  that  rising  wage  inequality  will  cause  high-wage 
                                                
36 Concerns about the importance of non-homothetic preferences have also recently been raised in the trade 
literature:  Markusen  (2010)  argues  that  taking  non-homothetic  preferences  into  account  causes  the 
theoretical predictions from a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model to better account for certain well-known 
phenomena  such  as  growing  wage  gaps,  home  bias  and  missing  trade.  The  empirical  evidence  on  this 
importance  is  somewhat  mixed:  Trefler  (1995)  finds  that  allowing  for  non-homothetic  preferences  has 
limited value added, whereas Hunter (1991) finds it can explain a non-negligible part of missing trade.   31 
workers to demand more low-skill service work so as to free up more of their time for 
market work. However, Autor and Dorn (2010) failed to find much evidence in support 
of this hypothesis. 
  As a first indication that these industry shifts can be quantitatively important, Table 
10  shows  the  result  of  decomposing  aggregate  occupational  employment  share 
changes into within- and between-industry components. As the model we estimated 
above  suggests,  one  sees  large  negative  within-industry  components  for  some 
occupations such as office clerks (ISCO 41), building workers, craft and related trades 
workers (ISCO 71-74), stationary plant and related operators (ISCO 81) and machine 
operators  and  assemblers  (ISCO  82)  and  large  positive  effects  for  others,  e.g. 
managers (ISCO 12,13) and some (associate) professional occupations (ISCO 21,31,34). 
However, Table 10 also shows that the between-industry component may be important 
– in particular, it suggests an increase in the demand for industry output intense in life 
science  and  health  (associate)  professionals  (ISCO  22,32),  other  (associate) 
professionals  (ISCO  24,34)  and  some  low-paid  service  (elementary)  workers  (ISCO 
51,91)  at  the  expense  of  demand  for  manufactured  goods  which  use  operators, 
assemblers and other production occupations (ISCO 72,74,81,82) intensively.37 
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  To  analyze  these  effects,  we  need  to  go  further  and  not  condition  on  industry 
output. To do this, we need an industry demand curve: we will start by deriving this 
from a demand curve at the individual level. Assume that individual k has income Zk 
and that the demand for the output of industry i by individual k is given by:  
    
1
1 i
ik k i Y Z P
q g
-
- =                                                                         (9) 
                                                
37 These results are qualitatively identical to those reported in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for the US after 
1979.   32 
where  i q  is the income elasticity of demand for good i which will be equal to one if 
preferences are homothetic but not otherwise,  i P  the price of good i relative to the 
aggregate  price index  and  1/ (1 ) g -  the elasticity of  substitution  between goods in 
consumption with  1 g < . Where  1 i q ¹  for all industries one should acknowledge that 
this iso-elastic formulation of the demand curve does not satisfy the budget constraint 
in which case (9) is best thought of as a local approximation to the demand curve that 
will not be too bad if, as we find below, departures from homotheticity are fairly small. 
  If there are L individuals in the economy and we assume that income has a log-
normal distribution with variance 
2 s , we can add up the demand curve (9) over all 
individuals in the economy to arrive at the following aggregate demand equation: 
          ( ) ( )
2 1 1
log log 1 log 1 log
2 1
i i i i i i Y Y L P q q q q s
g
= + - + - -
-
                              (10) 
where  i Y   is  aggregate  demand  for  good  i  and  Y   is  real  aggregate  income.  This 
equation shows that there are a number of ways to test for non-homotheticity (i.e. 
1 i q ¹ )  in  the  data.  Firstly,  non-homotheticity  implies  that  the  elasticity  of  industry 
demand with respect to aggregate income will not be unity. Secondly, it implies that, 
for  a  given  aggregate  income,  population  affects  relative  product  demand.  The 
intuition for this is simple: if we compare two economies with the same aggregate GDP 
but  with  different  populations,  the  economy  with  the  lower  population  will  have  a 
higher total  demand for luxury goods as GDP per capita  is higher there. Thirdly, if 
preferences  are  non-homothetic,  we  would  expect  income  inequality  to  affect  the 
patterns of demand: for a given GDP more income inequality will be associated with 
higher demand for luxury goods. We test these three predictions of non-homotheticity 
below. 
  If we further assume that individual firms in each industry face iso-elastic demand 
curves (which we would expect to be more elastic than the industry demand curves and 
might  be  infinitely  elastic  if  industries  are  perfectly  competitive),  firms  maximize 
profits  by  setting  prices  as  a  constant  mark-up  over  marginal  costs,  or   33 
log log log i i P g = G -   with 
1 - g   the  price  mark-up.  Adding  time  (t)  and  country  (c) 
subscripts, this gives the following equation for the demand for good i:  
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            (11) 
Given that equation (11) enters equation (8) additively, we can estimate it separately to 
derive the impact of changes in relative product demand on employment. 
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  Results  from  estimating  equation  (11)  are  in  Table  11.  The  first  column  shows 
estimates if we assume homothetic preferences. As predicted by our model, the point 
estimate on industry marginal cost is negative and significant, the point estimate on 
log income per capita is 1, and the point estimate on log population is 1.01 and not 
significantly different from unity. 
  The next two columns of Table 11 test for non-homotheticity using the framework 
described above. Column 2 interacts log income per capita with a vector of industry 
dummies. Service industries are ranked from high-paid to low-paid by their mean UK 
wage in 1994 and their point estimates are deviations from the income elasticity for 
manufacturing. The estimated income elasticity of demand is significantly bigger only 
for three high-paid service industries: financial intermediation; real estate, renting and 
business activity; and transport, storage and communication. Also note that the point 
estimates for the three lowest-paid service industries (health and social work, other 
community, social and personal service activities and hotels and restaurants, which are 
all are intense in personal protective and service occupations (ISCO  51) and service 
elementary occupations (ISCO 91)) are not statistically significant from zero. Finally, 
the  magnitude  of  these  departures  from  homotheticity  is  broadly  consistent  with 
estimates found in the literature: Hunter (1991) finds income elasticities for different 
types of goods that range between 0.45 for food and 1.91 for medical products.   34 
  In sum, the second column of Table 11 is not clearly supportive of the idea that the 
relative growth in low-paid service (elementary) occupations that we observe in Table 1 
is best explained by an increase in real income and non-homothetic preferences.  
  Finally, column 3 of Table 11 repeats the analysis in column 2 while adding to the 
regression specification a measure of income inequality – rescaled to have mean 0 and 
standard deviation 1 across our sample of countries - and its interaction with industry 
dummies  to  further  capture  the  possibility  that  the  demand  for  low-paid  services 
partially  reflects  the  marketization  of  household  production  by  high-wage  workers 
who are finding that market work is more rewarding.38 Just as in column 2, the left-
hand panel of column 3 reports the income elasticity by industry. The higher income 
elasticities for the three high-paid service industries remain, while there is again no 
general support of the idea that real income growth drives up demand for workers in 
low-paid service jobs.  
  The  right-hand  panel  of  column  3  shows  the  interaction  effects  of  overall  log 
income  inequality  with  a  vector  of  industry  dummies.  These  point  estimates  could 
capture  the idea  that in countries with more  wage  inequality, high-income workers 
want to buy more market-provided low-paid services. The point estimate is positive 
and significant for financial intermediation as well as for one low-paid industry, hotels 
and  restaurants.  This  indicates  some  scope  for  the  income  inequality  channel  for 
explaining job polarization, but it should be noted that Table 11 is estimated using 
cross-country variation in wage inequality whereas only variation in wage inequality 
over time can explain job polarization. Since the standard deviation in wage inequality 
over our 14 year time period is around 15% of the standard deviation of the cross-
country  variation  in  wage  inequality,  one  standard  deviation  increase  in  inequality 
between  1993 and  2006  is associated  with a  3%  faster increase  in  the demand  for 
                                                
38 The inequality measure used is the log(p90/p10) derived from the ECHP and EU-SILC data discussed in 
section 4.C. For each country, the log(p90/p10) has been averaged over observations available for the period 
1993-2006  and  rescaled  to  mean  0  and  standard  deviation  1.  Our  results  are  robust  to  using  other 
measures of inequality (log(p90/p50) or log(p50/p10)) whether or not averaged over time – although the 
latter reduce the sample size due to incomplete time series for several countries.   35 
financial intermediation and hotels and restaurants. This effect is small compared to 
the estimated impacts of technological progress and globalization. 
  The  evidence  provided  in  this  section  does  not  suggest  systematic  non-
homotheticity in preferences at our level of aggregation which suggests that product 
demand  effects  cannot  explain  a  significant  part  of  job  polarization.  To  further 
examine  the  relative  importance  of  technological  progress,  offshoring  and  product 
demand changes in explaining job polarization, the next section brings these channels 
together. 
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  In this section we examine to what extent our task-based framework can explain 
job polarization documented in Tables 1 and 2, attempting to break down the total 
effect into the different channels. To do this we compare actually observed changes in 
the job structure with a variety of counterfactuals constructed from our model in which 
we turn off and on different channels of influence.   
  In  all  these  simulations  we  assume,  in  the  interests  of  keeping  results  to  a 
digestible length, that relative wages are constant (in line with our earlier findings that, 
in our European countries, there seems to be little wage response), that there is no 
country heterogeneity in the impact of technology and off-shoring at the task level and 
that preferences are homothetic39.  
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  Our  aim  is  to  work  out  the  predictions  of  our  framework  for  the  shares  of 
employment in different occupations. To do this we work out the predictions for the 
                                                
39 This last assumption is very convenient as it means that we do not have to keep track of the way in which 
technology and globalization are changing the distribution of income as any such changes will have no effect 
on the mix of product demand.   36 
level  of  employment  by  industry,  occupation,  country  and  year,  ijct N ,  and  then 
aggregate. So, for example, the total employment by occupation country and year can 
be derived as: 
         
jct ijct i N N =∑                                                                                                 
(12) 
Using  (8)  and  retaining  only  the  terms  that  will  influence  the  shares  of  total 
employment  (e.g.  excluding  time  effects  that  affect  all  countries,  industries  and 
occupations equally) we can derive the following expression for the change in log ijct N : 
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where  | i jct s  is the (observable) share for industry i of total employment in country c, 
year t and occupation j.  
  In (13)  jt G represents the impact of technology and offshoring on the demand for 
occupation j conditional on output and industry marginal costs as reported in Tables 6 
and 7 of section 5. The first terms in square brackets in equation (13) reflect changes 
in the demand for occupation j because of changes in industry marginal costs. This 
term corresponds to the importance of the conditional demand estimates for industry 
marginal costs in Tables 8 and 9 of section 5. Finally, the last term in square brackets 
in equation (13) captures the importance of changes in industry output, examined in 
section 6 above. It is this decomposition that we will use to examine to which extent 
the different channels in our model can explain job polarization. 
  Let us therefore first consider the first term on the right-hand side of (13) in more 
detail.  Here we  make the  assumption that  the  occupation  specific trend changes in 
( , ) Nj Kj a a  can be captured by keeping  Nj a  constant while allowing  Kj a  to vary over 
time.  This  means  technology  and  offshoring  are  assumed  to  affect  the  task-level 
production  function  only  by  augmenting  the  productivity  of  factors  apart  from 
domestic  labor  (e.g.  capital  for  technology,  foreign  labor  for  offshoring).  Said 
differently, this  simplification rules out that technological  progress (in  part) implies 
human workers becoming “innately” increasingly productive in performing non-routine   37 
tasks  relative  to  routine  tasks.40  Given  our  conclusion  that  wages  have  not  been 
affected by technology and offshoring, we get from (8) that: 
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where the right-hand side of (14) is given by the point estimate on RTI of -1.19/100 in 
the second column of Table 9 multiplied by the occupation specific RTI measure. When 
we also want to account for the impact of offshoring, this term is given by the sum of 
the point estimate on RTI multiplied by the RTI measure and the point estimate on 
offshoring of -0.32/100 multiplied by our measure of offshorability. Finally note that 
(14) predicts employment polarization through the direct impact on occupation  j of 
task-biased technological progress and offshoring while holding marginal costs and 
industry output fixed. 
  Now let us consider the ‘marginal cost’ term in square brackets on the right-
hand side of equation (13) in more detail. Firstly, the very first term on the right-hand 
side,  1/(1 ) h - , is the  point  estimate  on  log  industry marginal costs of  1.07  in  the 
second column of Table 9. Secondly, we approximate industry marginal cost changes 
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with  | j i k  the cost share of task j in industry marginal costs. The terms on the right-
hand side of (15) can be calculated as follows: 
                                                
40 In other words, we restrict our attention to the hypothesis that all tasks performed are subject to machine 
displacement or to displacement by foreign labor. This is in line with the general characterization in Autor, 
Levy and Murnane (2003), Autor and Dorn (2010) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011). Note, however, that this 
simplifying  assumption  is  not  innocuous.  For  equation  (8)  to  predict  employment  polarization  following 
technological progress or offshoring, it requires that the elasticity of substitution between labor and other 
inputs in the production of tasks is larger than the elasticity of substitution between tasks in the production 
of goods. The estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 confirm this: the absolute value of the estimated 
wage elasticity exceeds the point estimate on industry marginal costs.   38 
- The term  | j i k is the cost share of task j in industry marginal costs, which we 
approximate  by  the  average  employment  share  of  occupation  j  in  industry  i 
across countries. 
- The last term in square brackets is obtained by dividing the right-hand side of 
equation  (14)  by  1/(1 ) 1/(1 ) r h - - - .  This  is  be  done  as  follows.  Given  an 
estimate for  ) 1 /( 1 h - , to know 1/(1 ) 1/(1 ) r h - - -  we further need an estimate 
of  ) 1 /( 1 r - . Assuming a value of 0.6 for k , the share of domestic labor in task 
production, we can get this from the point estimate on the log wage of -3.67 in 
the  second  column  of  Table  9,  which  in  absolute  value  is  an  estimate  of 
(1 )/ (1 ) / (1 ) k r k h - - + - . The implied value of  ) 1 /( 1 r - is 7.57.41 
  The final term in square brackets in equation (13) is industry output. We impute 
changes in industry output differentiating equation (11) using the point estimates on 
industry marginal costs reported in column 1 of Table 11 together with the predicted 
changes in industry marginal costs which we derive from (15). 
 
  7.B Some counterfactuals 7.B Some counterfactuals 7.B Some counterfactuals 7.B Some counterfactuals               
   
  Table 12 presents our counterfactuals. To keep the results digestible we report two 
statistics.  Panel  A  looks  at  the  average  percentage  point  difference  in  employment 
share changes between the group of lowest-paying relative to the group of middling 
occupations  defined  as  Table  2.42  Panel  B  looks  at  the  average  percentage  point 
difference  in  employment  share  changes  between  the  group  of  highest-paid 
occupations relative to the group of middling occupations also defined as in Table 2. 
                                                
41  Note  that  this  exercise  gives  an  estimate  of  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  tasks  of  1.07  and 
between factors of task production of 7.57. These are derived from the estimated coefficients on wages and 
industry marginal costs. However, our wage and marginal cost data are less than ideal and as a consequence 
our estimates of these elasticities of substitution not very accurate. We will return to this issue in section 7B. 
42 Note that the actual differences of 9.11 and 14.72 reported in Table 12 are not exactly the same as the 
differences of 9.35 (=1.58+7.77) and 13.96 (=6.19+7.77) between the EU averages reported in Table 2 
since Ireland has been excluded from Table 12 because of missing OECD STAN data.   39 
  In  each  panel,  let  us  first  consider  the  first  row.  The  numbers  in  the  first  two 
columns are, respectively, our point estimate for the elasticity of substitution between 
factors in task production of 7.57 and  between tasks in goods production of 1.07. 
Column I then uses these point estimates – among others - in equations (14) and (15) 
to  predict  occupational  employment  changes:  these  equations  are  substituted  into 
equation (13) while holding industry output constant (i.e.  log / 0 ict Y t ¶ ¶ = ). Note that 
this  counterfactual  unambiguously  predicts  polarization  through  the  effect  of 
technological  progress  and  offshoring  (column  i),  or  of  only  technological  progress 
(column ii). 
  In  addition  to  column  I,  column  II  further  accounts  for  relative  price  changes 
induced by technological progress and globalization by substituting predicted changes 
in industry output from (11) into (13). In doing this, we make use of our point estimate 
for the price elasticity of product demand of 0.75. The remaining numbers in the first 
row  of  each  panel  repeat  this  exercise  but  replace  the  estimated  price  elasticity  of 
product  demand  of  0.75  with  realistic  but  more  extreme  values  of  0.25  and  1.25 
respectively.43  
  Finally  note  that  the  contribution  of  the  product  demand  effects  is  expected  to 
attenuate the extent of polarization. This is because the model predicts a decrease in 
the relative price of goods intensive in the use of routine task or offshorable inputs. 
This reduction in relative prices causes a rise in relative product demand thus partially 
off-setting the fall in the demand for the occupations. In the hamburger example, the 
fall in the price of burgers leads to a rise in the demand for burgers and this acts to 
partially off-set the fall in the demand for patty-makers because of the improvement 
in technology. 
   Several  things can  be  learnt  from  the first row  of  panel A. First of  all, the  first 
number  in  column  I  shows  that  –  conditional  on  industry  output  –  technological 
progress  and  offshoring  can  explain  a  6.34  percentage  point  increase  in  the 
                                                
43  Also  note  these  numbers  cover  the  95%  confidence  interval  of  the  estimate  since  the  standard  error 
presented in Table 10 is 0.23.   40 
employment share of low-paying occupations relative to middling occupations. Note 
that  this  is  70%  of  the  actual  difference  of  9.11  percentage  points.  Of  these  6.34 
percentage points, 78% (=4.92/6.34) can be accounted for by routinization. Secondly, 
column II allows for industry output to vary following changes in relative output prices 
due  to  technological  progress  and  offshoring.  Compared  to  the  counterfactuals  in 
column I, the counterfactuals in column II predict less polarization: 50% (=4.52/9.11) 
rather than 70%  (=6.34/9.11) of  the actual  difference.  Also  note that the  predicted 
attenuation  is  robust  to  choosing  more  extreme  values  for  the  price  elasticity  of 
product demand: assuming an elasticity of 0.25 increases the predicted polarization to 
51% (=4.67/9.11) whereas assuming an elasticity of 1.25 predicts 48% (=4.37/9.11) of 
the actual difference. In all cases, comparing columns i and ii again shows that over 
three quarters of job polarization is explained by the impact of routinization.  
  In  sum,  our  model  can  explain  a  significant  part  of  the  observed  increase  in 
employment  shares  of  low-paid  to  middling  occupations.  The  job  polarization 
predicted by our model is driven by the substitution of capital for routine jobs as well 
as the substitution towards routine tasks and away from other tasks in routine-task 
intensive  industries.  However,  the  impact  of  task-replacing  capital  on  the  different 
occupations  is  attenuated  by  induced  changes  in  relative  output  prices  and  this 
attenuation  seems  relatively  insensitive  to  the  range  of  product  demand  elasticities 
that are realistic for the level of aggregation that we have.  
  We now turn to the explanatory power of our model with respect to the increase of 
high-paying occupations relative to middling occupations reported in the first row of 
panel B. From column I it follows that the combined impacts of technological progress 
and  offshoring  can  predict  a  relative  employment  share  increase  for  high-paying 
occupations  of  10.44  percentage  points  (or  71%  of  the  actual  14.72  percentage 
points), of which 84% (=8.75/10.44) is accounted for by the impact of routinization. 
Less polarization is predicted when industry output is endogenized as in column II, 
reducing the predictive power from 71% (=10.44/14.72) to 51% (=7.56/14.72). The   41 
predictions of our unconditional model do not seem very sensitive to alternative values 
for the price elasticity of product demand. 
  An interesting question is how robust our model is to assuming different values for 
the elasticity of substitution between occupations and other task inputs (of which the 
point estimate is 7.57)  and  between  tasks in goods  production  (of which  the point 
estimate is  1.07).  The  problem in  doing this, however,  is that there  exist  no  other 
studies  with  estimates  of  these  elasticities.  At  best,  we  can  look  at  different  but 
distinctly related estimates for guidance. For example, Katz and Murphy (1992) find an 
elasticity of substitution between high school and college equivalent men and women 
of 1.4. In line with this, Card and Lemieux (2001) find an estimate between 1.1 and 1.6 
for men and women of these different schooling types and an estimate between 2 and 
2.5 for men only. Card and Lemieux (2001) also report an elasticity of substitution 
between  five-year age  groups between  4  and  6. In this  light, our estimates  do  not 
seem  unrealistic.  After  all,  we  argue  that  our  task-based  model  is  better  suited  to 
capture the impact of routinization and offshoring – hence the relatively high elasticity 
of substitution between occupations and other task inputs of 7.57 and the relatively 
low  estimate  of  1.07  for  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  tasks  in  goods 
production. In any case, the remaining rows in Table 12 assume lower values for the 
elasticity of substitution between occupations and other task inputs and higher values 
for  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  tasks  in  goods  production  since  this  is 
expected to decrease the predictive power of our model. 
The  third  row  in  each  panel  of  Table  12  assumes  an  elasticity  of  substitution 
between occupations and other task inputs of 4 rather than 7.57. This decreases the 
predictive power of our conditional model from 70% (=6.34/9.11) to 34% (=3.13/9.11) 
and of our unconditional model from 50% (=4.52/9.11) to 23% (=2.10/9.11) in panel A 
and from 71% (=10.44/14.72) to 34% (=4.99/14.72) and from 51% (=7.56/14.72) to 
24% (=3.49/14.72) in panel B. The final row in each panel of Table 12 assumes an 
elasticity  of  substitution  between  tasks  in  goods  production  of  4  rather  than  1.07, 
thereby decreasing the predictive power of our conditional model to 54% (=4.90/9.11)   42 
and of our unconditional model to 38% (=3.44/9.11) in panel A and of our conditional 
model to 49% (=7.16/14.72) and of our unconditional model to 35% (=5.12/14.72) in 
panel B. In sum, even choosing more extreme values for the substitution elasticities in 
order  to  decrease  the  predictive  power  of  our  model,  we  can  still  explain  about  a 
quarter of job polarization in Europe.  
In  conclusion,  our  model  is  capable  of  explaining  a  sizeable  fraction  of  the 
observed polarization. We have also shown how the ‘general equilibrium’ effects, the 
shifts in product demand caused by relative price changes are non-trivial and must be 
explicitly taken account of. 
 
  8. 8. 8. 8.       CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS       
   
  The employment structure in Western European countries has been polarizing over 
the period 1993-2006 with rising employment shares for high-paid professionals and 
managers  as  well  as  low-paid  personal  services  workers  and  falling  employment 
shares of manufacturing and routine office workers.  
  In  this  paper  we  have  developed  a  simple  theoretical  framework  capable  of 
capturing the general equilibrium effects that link the demands for different types of 
workers. We use this framework to estimate the importance of technological change, 
globalization,  institutions  and  product  demand  effects  on  the  demand  for  different 
occupations.  Some  factors  (institutional  differences  between  countries  possibly 
affecting  relative  wages,  non-homothetic  preferences)  are  found  to  be  relatively 
unimportant in explaining polarization. We find that the single most important factor 
behind the observed changes seems to be the routinization hypothesis of Autor, Levy 
and Murnane though we find some evidence of decreased demand for jobs that are 
offshorable.  However,  we  have  also  shown  that  induced  changes  in  relative  output 
prices  lead  to  non-negligible  effects  on  occupational  employment  and  that  these 
effects tend to attenuate job polarization but not eliminate it. Hence, job polarization 
is having a powerful impact on the structure of employment of all European countries.   43
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Note: Employment growth averaged across countries, no imputation for countries
with shorter data spans.
Figure 1. Cumulative yearly employment growth of high- and
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Note: Employment pooled across countries. 1993-2006 long difference: employment shares
for 1993 and/or 2006 imputed on the basis of average annual growth rates for countries
with shorter data spans.
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Corporate managers  12 4.47% 1.23
Physical, mathematical and engineering professionals 21 2.94% 1.02
Life science and health professionals  22 1.96% -0.12
Other professionals  24 2.80% 0.65
Managers of small enterprises 13 3.53% 1.25
Physical, mathematical and engineering associate professionals  31 3.96% 0.87
Other associate professionals  34 6.85% 2.15
Life science and health associate professionals  32 3.05% 0.69
Drivers and mobile plant operators  83 5.37% -0.19
Stationary plant and related operators  81 1.71% -0.38
Metal, machinery and related trade work  72 8.15% -2.29
Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trade workers 73 1.29% -0.40
Office clerks  41 11.96% -1.94
Customer service clerks  42 1.97% 0.18
Extraction and building trades workers  71 7.98% -0.51
Machine operators and assemblers  82 6.55% -1.96
Other craft and related trade workers  74 3.13% -1.35
Personal and protective service workers  51 7.10% 1.11
Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 93 4.03% 0.45
Models, salespersons and demonstrators  52 6.56% -1.38





Notes: All countries, long difference 1993-2006. Employment pooled across countries.
Employment shares in 1993 and/or 2006 imputed on the basis of average annual growth rates for
countries with shorter data spans. Occupations are ordered by their mean wage rank in 1993
across the 16 European countries.
Table 1.  Table 1.  Table 1.  Table 1. Levels and changes in the shares of hours worked 1993-2006 for occupations ranked 






code Occupations ranked by 1993 mean European wage   48
 
 
Austria 23% -0.59 53% -14.58 25% 15.17
Belgium 17% 1.48 49% -9.50 34% 8.03
Denmark 24% -0.96 40% -7.16 36% 8.13
Finland 18% 6.66 39% -6.54 43% -0.12
France 22% -0.74 48% -12.07 30% 12.81
Germany 22% 3.04 56% -8.72 22% 5.67
Greece 22% 1.75 48% -6.08 31% 4.34
Ireland 19% 6.19 46% -5.47 35% -0.72
Italy 27% -8.20 51% -9.08 22% 17.28
Luxembourg 22% -1.66 50% -8.45 28% 10.10
Netherlands 17% 2.27 38% -4.68 45% 2.41
Norway 23% 4.96 39% -6.52 38% 1.57
Portugal 26% 2.39 47% -1.13 27% -1.26
Spain 28% 0.96 49% -7.04 23% 6.07
Sweden 22% 1.91 42% -6.96 37% 5.04
UK 17% 5.77 44% -10.32 39% 4.55
EU average 22% 1.58 46% -7.77 32% 6.19
Notes: Long difference 1993-2006. Occupational employment pooled within each country. In each country














Table 2.  Table 2.  Table 2.  Table 2. Initial shares of hours worked and percentage changes over 1993-2006 for high-, middling and 
low-paying occupations
4 lowest paying occupations 9 middling occupations 8 highest paying occupations
Employment 
share in 1993
df (1) (2) (3) (4)
3.73 3.43 4.01 3.77
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
601.95 574.83 1192.99 1084.27
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2.26 2.27 5.26 4.93
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
37.70 36.69 69.71 62.38







58.49 41.01 98.18 99.96
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R









Notes: All countries; 36,556 observations for each ANOVA. F-statistics reported,
corresponding p-values in brackets. All specifications control for industry,
occupation, country and year effects. All interactions in the table are therefore
exactly identified, except for industry*country*year, which additionally contains






Table 3. Table 3. Table 3. Table 3. Analysis of variance models




F-statistics for interactions:  49 
Occupations ranked by 1993 mean European wage  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corporate managers  12 1.80 -1.18 1.15 -1.29 -0.59 2.05
Physical, mathematical and engineering professionals 21 1.50 -0.86 -0.35 -0.80 -0.37 2.83
Life science and health professionals  22 1.47 -0.16 1.73 -0.81 -0.64 2.92
Other professionals  24 1.29 -1.63 1.14 -1.49 -0.51 2.69
Managers of small enterprises 13 1.80 -1.18 1.15 -1.29 -0.59 2.05
Physical, mathematical and engineering associate professionals  31 0.89 0.20 -0.44 -0.02 -0.27 2.22
Other associate professionals  34 0.75 -1.37 0.93 -1.25 -0.12 2.14
Life science and health associate professionals  32 0.36 0.21 0.86 -0.26 -0.64 2.40
Drivers and mobile plant operators  83 -0.59 1.33 0.01 0.90 -0.63 1.46
Stationary plant and related operators  81 -0.49 1.33 -1.21 1.38 1.63 1.56
Metal, machinery and related trade work  72 0.43 1.16 -0.29 0.65 0.29 1.68
Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trade workers 73 -1.30 0.81 -1.79 1.51 -0.62 1.69
Office clerks  41 -0.42 -1.29 0.04 -0.89 1.21 1.91
Customer service clerks  42 -0.36 -0.82 0.74 -0.75 -0.27 1.89
Extraction and building trades workers  71 -0.23 0.98 -0.64 0.82 -0.59 1.55
Machine operators and assemblers  82 -0.46 1.31 -1.33 1.41 3.18 1.48
Other craft and related trade workers  74 -1.36 0.67 -1.30 1.18 -0.27 1.57
Personal and protective service workers  51 -0.37 -0.16 0.82 -0.35 -0.64 1.67
Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 93 -1.00 0.52 -0.53 0.64 0.87 1.41
Models, salespersons and demonstrators  52 -0.53 -0.94 1.00 -0.86 -0.64 1.66
Sales and service elementary occupations 91 -1.38 -0.11 -0.55 0.28 -0.37 1.40
Table 4. Table 4. Table 4. Table 4. Task measures, offshorability, and mean education levels for occupations ordered by their mean 1993 European wage
Notes: Columns 1-4: Rescaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1, a higher value means a task is more important. Values for ISCO 12 and 13 are
identical because ONET SOC codes do not allow distinction. Routine task intensity is defined as Routine task importance divided by the sum of
Abstract and Service task importances, subsequently standardized. Column 5:Rescaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1, a higher value means
more offshorable. Values for ISCO 12 and 13 have been made the same by taking the mean weighted by hours worked. Column 6: Weighted by
hours worked. 1=up to and including lower secondary education, 2=upper secondary and post-secondary (non-tertiary) education, 3=tertiary or
post-graduate education. Unweighted mean across all countries, for the first year in which education data was available (typically 1999). Values for


















code  50 
Occupations ranked by the 1993 mean European wage ISCO 1993 2006 1993 2006
Corporate managers  12 3,472 3,724 1.70 1.60
Physical, mathematical and engineering professionals 21 3,038 3,170 1.43 1.47
Life science and health professionals  22 2,720 3,164 1.22 1.39
Other professionals  24 2,712 2,910 1.17 1.26
Managers of small enterprises  13 2,653 2,685 1.15 0.93
Physical, mathematical and engineering associate professionals  31 2,150 2,324 0.74 0.80
Other associate professionals  34 2,115 2,227 0.74 0.69
Life science and health associate professionals  32 1,915 2,018 0.39 0.28
Drivers and mobile plant operators  83 1,789 1,916 0.05 -0.04
Stationary plant and related operators  81 1,793 1,954 0.01 -0.03
Metal, machinery and related trade work  72 1,748 1,927 -0.01 0.02
Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trade workers 73 1,733 1,968 -0.09 -0.02
Office clerks  41 1,679 1,865 -0.36 -0.15
Customer service clerks  42 1,613 1,732 -0.50 -0.50
Extraction and building trades workers  71 1,624 1,750 -0.58 -0.61
Machine operators and assemblers  82 1,565 1,728 -0.73 -0.61
Other craft and related trade workers  74 1,504 1,598 -0.89 -0.99
Personal and protective service workers  51 1,424 1,538 -1.13 -1.05
Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 93 1,402 1,518 -1.22 -1.22
Models, salespersons and demonstrators  52 1,237 1,344 -1.43 -1.50
Sales and service elementary occupations 91 1,112 1,242 -1.68 -1.70
Table 5. Table 5. Table 5. Table 5. Real monthly wages of occupations across 16 European countries in 1993 and 2006, sorted by 1993 wage rank 
Standardized wage rank
Notes: Mean occupational wages weighted by weekly hours worked in each country in 1993 and 2006, unweighted average
across countries. Average unweighted wage rank across countries has been rescaled to mean zero and unit standard
deviation. The correlation between the standardized wage rank in 1993 and in 2006 is 0.994.
Real monthly wage in 
2000 Euros  51 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1.33* 0.80* 1.22* 0.81*
(0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15)
-1.33* -0.74* -1.22* -0.75*
(0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15)
1.28* 0.31 1.19* 0.18
(0.13) (0.18) (0.14) (0.19)
-1.52* -1.44*
(0.12) (0.13)
-0.75* -0.45* -0.40* -0.20 -0.25 -0.21
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
-0.19 -0.08 -0.14 -0.13 -0.08 -0.14 -0.18 -0.08 -0.13 -0.13 -0.09
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
-
-
- - - -
- Offshorability -
Table 6A Table 6A Table 6A Table 6A. Conditional effect of task importance and offshorability 








Notes: All countries; 34,816 observations for each regression; all regressions have an R² of 0.96. All
regressions contain dummies for industry-country-year and industry-occupation-country. Point estimates 
on the task measures and offshorability have been multiplied by 100 to reflect percentage point changes.
Standard errors clustered by country-industry-occupation. *Significant at the 5% level or better.
Log wage
- - -
- RTI - - - - - - - -
-
-




























Notes: All countries; 34,816 observations for
each regression; all regressions have an R² of
0.96. All regressions contain dummies for
industry-country-year and industry-
occupation-country. Like the task measures
and offshorability, the education level has been
rescaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
Point estimates on the task measures,
offshorability and the education level have been 
multiplied by 100. Standard errors clustered by
occupation-country-industry. *Significant at





Table 6B.  Table 6B.  Table 6B.  Table 6B. Conditional effect of task 
importance, education and offshorability 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ABSTRACT  task importance* 2.40 ABSTRACT  task importance* 1.63
country dummies (0.00) industry dummies (0.09)
ROUTINE task importance* 1.00 ROUTINE task importance* 1.83
country dummies (0.45) industry dummies (0.05)
SERVICE task importance* 1.19 SERVICE task importance* 1.34
country dummies (0.27) industry dummies (0.20)
RTI* 2.47 RTI* 1.87
country dummies (0.00) industry dummies (0.05)
Offshorability* 2.29 2.10 Offshorability* 1.23 1.06
country dummies (0.00) (0.01) industry dummies (0.26) (0.39)
Table 7.  Table 7.  Table 7.  Table 7. Country and industry heterogeneity in the conditional impacts of technological change and 
offshoring                                                                                                                                                            
Dependent variable: Log(hours worked/1000)
-
F-statistic (p-value) for interaction 
with a linear timetrend:
F-statistic (p-value) for interaction 
with a linear timetrend:
A. Country heterogeneity B. Industry heterogeneity
-
-
Notes: All countries; 34,816 observations for each regression. All regressions control for the
occupation-country-year specific log wage and dummies for industry-country-year and industry-
occupation-country. Standard errors clustered by industry-occupation-country. The null hypothesis
is that interactions of the task importances or of offshorability with country or industry dummies are














-0.50* -0.45* -0.23 -0.23
(0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
0.99* 0.99* 0.83* 0.83*
(0.21) (0.22) (0.14) (0.14)
1.00* 1.00* 1 1
(0.08) (0.08) - -
-0.58* -0.56* -0.81* -0.78*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0.10)
R





Log gross industry 
capital stock
Notes: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway and Spain
in columns 1-2 (17,242 observations); all countries except Ireland in
columns 3-4 (32,044 observations). Each regression includes dummies for
industry-occupation-country. Point estimates on the task measures and
offshorability have been multiplied by 100. Standard errors clustered by
country-industry-occupation. *Significant at the 5% level or better. 
Log wage













Table 8 Table 8 Table 8 Table 8. Conditional labor demand                                                                                                                                                                 
Dependent variable: Log(hours worked/1000)
-















-0.28* -0.32* -0.25 -0.22


















Table 9.  Table 9.  Table 9.  Table 9. Conditional labor demand: instrumented wages                        
and reduced form
Dependent variable: Log(hours worked/1000)










Log wage - -
Log industry marginal 
costs
- -




Notes: All countries except Germany, Ireland and Italy in columns 1 and 2
(28,817 observations); all countries in columns 3 and 4 (34,816
observations). All regressions contain dummies for industry-occupation-
country cells. Supply shift includes gender and immigrant status;
distribution of demographics across occupations averaged across
countries. Point estimates on the task measures and offshorability have
been multiplied by 100. Standard errors clustered by country-industry-
occupation in columns 3 and 4. *Significant at the 5% level or better. 
Log industry output - -  56 







Corporate managers  12 1.23 1.26 -0.02
Physical, mathematical and engineering professionals 21 1.02 0.71 0.31
Life science and health professionals  22 -0.12 -0.41 0.29
Other professionals  24 0.65 0.03 0.62
Managers of small enterprises 13 1.25 1.19 0.06
Physical, mathematical and engineering associate professionals  31 0.87 0.81 0.06
Other associate professionals  34 2.15 1.37 0.78
Life science and health associate professionals  32 0.69 0.22 0.46
Drivers and mobile plant operators  83 -0.19 0.09 -0.27
Stationary plant and related operators  81 -0.38 -0.02 -0.36
Metal, machinery and related trade work  72 -2.29 -1.13 -1.17
Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trade workers 73 -0.40 -0.18 -0.22
Office clerks  41 -1.94 -2.26 0.32
Customer service clerks  42 0.18 0.11 0.07
Extraction and building trades workers  71 -0.51 -0.24 -0.27
Machine operators and assemblers  82 -1.96 -0.69 -1.27
Other craft and related trade workers  74 -1.35 -0.75 -0.59
Personal and protective service workers  51 1.11 -0.03 1.14
Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 93 0.45 0.80 -0.35
Models, salespersons and demonstrators  52 -1.38 -0.93 -0.45
Sales and service elementary occupations 91 0.89 0.05 0.85
Notes: All countries, long difference 1993-2006. Employment pooled across countries. All changes are
in percentage points.
Table 10. Table 10. Table 10. Table 10. Shiftshare analysis of changes in share of hours worked between and within industries for 
occupations ranked by the mean 1993 European wage
Change in occupational 































Table 11 Table 11 Table 11 Table 11. Product demand                                                                                                                                                                 
Dependent variable: Log(industry output)
(3)



















Deviation from interaction with manufacturing:
Electricity, gas and water supply -
Financial intermediation -
Real estate, renting and business 
activity
-









Notes: All countries except Ireland; 2,100 observations per regression. Industry "Private
household with employed persons" included in "Other community, social.." for France,
Portugal, Spain and the UK. Each regression includes dummies for industry cells. Industries
ranked by their mean gross real hourly UK wage in 1994; the rank of manufacturing is 6. Log
income inequality is log(p90/p10) averaged over 1993-2006 and rescaled to mean 0 and
standard deviation 1. Standard errors clustered by country-industry. *Significant at the 5%
level or better. 
Hotels and restaurants -
Health and social work
Other community, social and 
personal service activities
-  58 
i. ALM + OFF ii. ALM i. ALM + OFF ii. ALM i. ALM + OFF ii. ALM i. ALM + OFF ii. ALM
7.57 1.07 6.34 4.92 4.52 3.48 4.67 3.61 4.37 3.36
6.00 1.07 4.93 3.84 3.46 2.67 3.61 2.80 3.30 2.54
4.00 1.07 3.13 2.45 2.10 1.63 2.26 1.76 1.95 1.49
7.57 2.00 5.88 4.60 4.18 3.24 4.33 3.37 4.02 3.11
7.57 4.00 4.90 3.90 3.44 2.72 3.59 2.85 3.29 2.59
7.57 1.07 10.44 8.75 7.56 6.32 7.70 6.45 7.41 6.19
6.00 1.07 8.05 6.76 5.77 4.83 5.92 4.96 5.62 4.69
4.00 1.07 4.99 4.20 3.49 2.92 3.64 3.06 3.33 2.78
7.57 2.00 9.39 7.90 6.78 5.68 6.93 5.81 6.63 5.55
7.57 4.00 7.16 6.06 5.12 4.32 5.27 4.45 4.96 4.18
Notes: Long difference 1993-2006, unweighted averages across 15 countries: no counterfactuals could be constructed for Ireland
because of missing OECD STAN data. Occupational employment pooled within the occupation groups as in Table 2.
Counterfactual percentage point changes in employment shares calculated from counterfactual percentage changes in
occupational employment. 
B. Percentage point difference in employment share changes between high-paying and  B. Percentage point difference in employment share changes between high-paying and  B. Percentage point difference in employment share changes between high-paying and  B. Percentage point difference in employment share changes between high-paying and 
middling occupations (actual=14.72): middling occupations (actual=14.72): middling occupations (actual=14.72): middling occupations (actual=14.72):
Table 12.  Table 12.  Table 12.  Table 12. Actual and counterfactual differences for changes in employment shares between low-paying and middling and 
between high-paying and middling occupations
A. Percentage point difference in employment share changes between low-paying and  A. Percentage point difference in employment share changes between low-paying and  A. Percentage point difference in employment share changes between low-paying and  A. Percentage point difference in employment share changes between low-paying and 
middling occupations (actual=9.11): middling occupations (actual=9.11): middling occupations (actual=9.11): middling occupations (actual=9.11):
I. CONDITIONAL I. CONDITIONAL I. CONDITIONAL I. CONDITIONAL II. UNCONDITIONAL II. UNCONDITIONAL II. UNCONDITIONAL II. UNCONDITIONAL
1/(1− ) 1/(1−η)
1∕(1− )= 0.75 1∕(1− )=1.25 1∕(1− )=0.25  59 
EXPLAINING JOB POLAR EXPLAINING JOB POLAR EXPLAINING JOB POLAR EXPLAINING JOB POLARIZATION IN EUROPE IZATION IN EUROPE IZATION IN EUROPE IZATION IN EUROPE:  :  :  :        
THE ROLES OF TECHNOL THE ROLES OF TECHNOL THE ROLES OF TECHNOL THE ROLES OF TECHNOLOGY OGY OGY OGY,  ,  ,  , GLOBALIZATION GLOBALIZATION GLOBALIZATION GLOBALIZATION       AND INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS       
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Appendix A: ELFS and IABS Appendix A: ELFS and IABS Appendix A: ELFS and IABS Appendix A: ELFS and IABS       
       
The ELFS contains data for 29 European countries which is collected on a national 
level.  The  same  set  of  characteristics  is  recorded  in  each  country,  common 
classifications and definitions are used, and data processed centrally by Eurostat. We 
limit our analyses to the fifteen countries that made up the European Union previous to 
the 2004 enlargement, plus Norway and minus Germany. These countries are the ones 
for which the most years of data are available, and we suspect them to be more similar 
in terms of access to technology or offshoring than the newer EU members. We retain 
only individuals who are employed according to the ILO definition of employment (the 
ELFS variable ilostat) and then eliminate a very small number of unpaid family workers 
using a variable classifying professional status (stapro) – our analyses are not sensitive 
to this.  
Table A1 presents, for each ELFS country we use, the years for which full data (i.e. 
employed individuals for whom a  2-digit occupation and a major industry group is 
known)  is  available.  Employment  is  measured  either  by  thousands  of  persons 
employed (given by the ELFS survey weights) or by thousands of weekly hours worked 
(ELFS survey weights multiplied by usual weekly hours).  
We  supplement  the  ELFS  with  German  employment  data  from  the  IABS-  a  2% 
random  sample  of  social  security  records  covering  1993-2004.  Since  the  2-digit 
occupation and industry codes used in the IABS differ somewhat from ISCO and NACE 
and no crosswalk was available, we matched them manually. Due to anonymization, 
occupation and industry codes in the IABS are no more disaggregate than the ones in 
the ELFS, and as a result we were not able to find a match for each ISCO and NACE: 
specifically, there were no separate equivalents of ISCO 13 and 74, and NACE E, H, N, 
and P in the IABS. Instead, employment in these occupations and industries is included 
in other ISCO and NACE categories: however, none of our analyses are sensitive to the 
exclusion  of Germany. Lastly, the  IABS industry  classification  changes in  2003: this 
classification  is  somewhat  easier  to reconcile with NACE,  but since it covers only 2   61 
years  and  no  crosswalk  exists  between  the  IABS  industry  classifications  before  and 
after 2003, we drop years 2003 and 2004.  
Tables A2 and A3, below, provide an overview of the 26 2-digit ISCO occupations 
and 17 NACE major group industries available in the ELFS. In our analyses, we drop 
several occupations and industries. The following occupations are dropped: legislators 
and  senior  officials  (ISCO  11);  teaching  professionals  and  teaching  associate 
professionals (ISCO 23 and 33); skilled agricultural and fishery workers (ISCO 61); and 
agricultural,  fishery  and  related  laborers  (ISCO  92).  We  also  drop  the  following 
industries: agriculture, forestry and hunting (NACE A); fishing (NACE B); mining and 
quarrying  (NACE  C);  public  administration  and  defense,  compulsory  social  security 
(NACE L); education (NACE M); and extra territorial organizations and bodies (NACE Q).  
These  occupations  and  industries  were  dropped  because  German  data  is  not 
random for workers who are not legally obliged to make social security contributions 
and because the OECD STAN data, especially the net operating surplus data, covering 
several public industries is unreliable (particularly, NACE L and M, and by association, 
ISCO  23  and  33).  Others  were  eliminated  because  the  data  appears  unreliable: 
employment  in  these  occupations  or  industries  occurs  only  in  a  small  number  of 
country-year cells, suggesting classification problems (ISCO 11, 92, and ISCO 61 by 
association through ISCO 92; NACE A, B, C, Q). However, our results44 are qualitatively 
identical when we do not drop these occupations and industries.  
Lastly, the ELFS sometimes contains 1-digit ISCO codes such as 20 and 30: since 
they appear only sporadically we treat them as measurement error and delete them. 
Our  results  are  unaffected  if  we  instead  assign  2-digit  ISCO  codes  based  on 
information about gender, age, and education level. The ELFS employment dataset is 
created by collapsing the individual employment data by country, industry, occupation, 
                                                
44 Those that can be reproduced with the full set of occupations and industries, i.e. summary statistics and 
conditional labor demand where industry output and marginal costs are proxied by industry-country-year 
dummies.   62 
and year. Table A4 shows the number of observations (individual and by country-year-
occupation-industry cells) we have left. 
The ELFS is also the source of our education information. For this, we use a three-
level education variable (hatlev1d) classified with ISCED: the lowest level of education 
corresponds to ISCED 0, 1, and 2 (pre-primary education; primary and lower secondary 
education); the middle level to ISCED 3 and 4 (upper secondary and post-secondary 
non-tertiary  education);  and  the  highest  level  to  ISCED  5  and  6  (tertiary  and 
postgraduate education). This variable is available for all countries, and cross-country 
correlations in average educational attainment by occupation are very high, as shown 
in Table A5. 
Lastly, Table A6 gives an idea of the absolute and relative employment sizes of the 
16 European countries in our restricted45 sample. 
                                                
45 I.e. where the aforementioned occupations and industries have been dropped.   63 
 
Years covered
Austria 1995-2006 340,772 3,498
Belgium 1993-2006 264,107 4,064
Denmark 1993-2006 133,390 3,592
Finland 1997-2006 153,989 2,743
France 1993-2006 632,257 4,625
Germany 1993-2002 8,011,935 2,270
Greece 1993-2006 593,992 3,984
Ireland 1998-2006 338,153 3,191
Italy 1993-1999, 2004-2006 811,788 3,232
Luxembourg 1993-2006 114,472 3,351
Netherlands 1993-2006 472,050 4,424
Norway 1996-2006 149,679 3,013
Portugal 1993-2006 332,552 4,341
Spain  1993-2006 833,596 4,774
Sweden 1997-2001; 2004-2006 260,905 2,246
UK 1993-2006 865,284 5,086
Table A1.  Table A1.  Table A1.  Table A1. Data availability for number of persons employed and number of 
weekly hours worked 
Total nr of 
obs
Total nr of obs in 
ind-occ-year cells
Sources: ELFS and IABS (for Germany). Notes: Number of observations with
non-missing ISCO and NACE codes. We dropped years 1993-1997 for Ireland
and 2002-2003 for Sweden because an industry (NACE code P) is missing and 
years 2000-2003 for Italy because an occupation (ISCO code 13) is missing.
We excluded Iceland altogether since only two years of complete data (2002
and 2003) are available. The same number of observations is available for the
number of persons employed and the number of weekly hours worked,
except for Germany, where there are 7,481,352 individual observations for
hours worked.  64 
ISCO code Occupation
11 Legislators and senior officials 
12 Corporate managers 
13 Managers of small enterprises 
21 Physical, mathematical and engineering professionals
22 Life science and health professionals 
23 Teaching professionals 
24 Other professionals 
31 Physical, mathematical and engineering associate professionals 
32 Life science and health associate professionals 
33 Teaching associate professionals 
34 Other associate professionals 
41 Office clerks 
42 Customer service clerks 
51 Personal and protective service workers 
52 Models, salespersons and demonstrators 
61 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers
71 Extraction and building trades workers 
72 Metal, machinery and related trade work 
73 Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trade workers
74 Other craft and related trade workers 
81 Stationary plant and related operators 
82 Machine operators and assemblers 
83 Drivers and mobile plant operators 
91 Sales and service elementary occupations
92 Agricultural, fishery and related labourers
93 Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport
Table A2.  Table A2.  Table A2.  Table A2. Overview of ISCO occupation codes available in the ELFS and their 
description
Note: In our analyses, we exclude occupations 11, 23, 33, 61, and 92.   65 




A Agriculture, forestry and hunting
B Fishing
C Mining and quarrying
D Manufacturing
E Electricity, gas and water supply
F Construction
G Wholesale and retail
H Hotels and restaurants
I Transport, storage and communication
J Financial intermediation
K Real estate, renting and business activity
L Public administration and defense, compulsory social security
M Education
N Health and social work
O Other community, social and personal service activities
P Private household with employed persons
Q Extra territorial organizations and bodies
Table A3.  Table A3.  Table A3.  Table A3. Overview of NACE industry codes available in the ELFS and their 
description
 Note: In our analyses, we exclude industries A, B, C, L, M, and Q. 
Years covered
Austria 1995-2006 280,886 2,246
Belgium 1993-2006 206,525 2,600
Denmark 1993-2006 105,508 2,345
Finland 1997-2006 125,318 1,802
France 1993-2006 497,324 2,870
Germany 1993-2002 7,201,954 1,520
Greece 1993-2006 447,781 2,577
Ireland 1998-2006 274,954 1,799
Italy 1993-1999, 2004-2006 653,617 1,924
Luxembourg 1993-2006 85,106 2,261
Netherlands 1993-2006 386,307 2,797
Norway 1996-2006 118,066 1,934
Portugal 1993-2006 252,315 2,626
Spain  1993-2006 672,604 2,885
Sweden 1997-2001; 2004-2006 209,252 1,446
UK 1993-2006 712,893 2,924
Table A4.  Table A4.  Table A4.  Table A4. Data availability for number of persons employed and number of 
weekly hours worked
Total nr of obs
Total nr of obs in 
ind-occ-year 
Sources: ELFS and IABS (for Germany). Notes: Number of observations in the
restricted sample: occupations 11, 23, 33, 61 and 92 and industries A, B, L,
M and Q are dropped. The same number of observations is available for the
number of persons employed and the number of weekly hours worked,
except for Germany, where there are 6,705,421 individual observations for
hours worked.  66
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxemb. Netherl. Norway Portugal Spain Sweden
Austria 1.00
Belgium 0.90 1.00
Denmark 0.90 0.93 1.00
Finland 0.90 0.92 0.86 1.00
France 0.90 0.97 0.98 0.89 1.00
Germany 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.87 0.92 1.00
Greece 0.90 0.98 0.93 0.94 0.97 0.91 1.00
Ireland 0.89 0.98 0.94 0.92 0.96 0.91 0.98 1.00
Italy 0.95 0.94 0.88 0.96 0.91 0.90 0.95 0.93 1.00
Luxemb. 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.96 0.92 0.92 0.92 1.00
Netherl. 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 1.00
Norway 0.89 0.95 0.98 0.87 0.98 0.90 0.96 0.96 0.91 0.89 0.96 1.00
Portugal 0.95 0.95 0.90 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.96 0.92 0.98 0.92 0.95 0.92 1.00
Spain 0.90 0.96 0.91 0.95 0.95 0.89 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.91 0.95 0.94 0.96 1.00
Sweden 0.87 0.94 0.96 0.87 0.97 0.88 0.95 0.95 0.88 0.87 0.93 0.97 0.91 0.93 1.00
UK 0.88 0.94 0.99 0.87 0.98 0.91 0.94 0.96 0.88 0.90 0.95 0.98 0.90 0.93 0.98
Table A5.  Table A5.  Table A5.  Table A5. Pairwise correlations of occupational education levels for 16 European countries
Notes: All correlations significant at the 1% level. Occupational education level weighted by occupational hours worked. 21 ISCO occupations included, see Table A2.  67 
       
Austria 3,150 2.27% 121,687 2.37%
Belgium 2,857 2.06% 106,846 2.08%
Denmark 2,205 1.59% 77,284 1.50%
Finland 1,994 1.44% 75,188 1.46%
France 18,108 13.06% 688,902 13.39%
Germany 34,519 24.89% 1,192,070 23.18%
Greece 3,172 2.29% 140,049 2.72%
Ireland 1,458 1.05% 53,284 1.04%
Italy 17,978 12.96% 708,214 13.77%
Luxembourg 135 0.10% 5,048 0.10%
Netherlands 6,255 4.51% 194,819 3.79%
Norway 1,855 1.34% 62,107 1.21%
Portugal 3,796 2.74% 153,666 2.99%
Spain  15,457 11.15% 615,678 11.97%
Sweden 3,510 2.53% 127,206 2.47%
UK 22,223 16.03% 821,410 15.97%
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Appendix B: Explaining the industry Appendix B: Explaining the industry Appendix B: Explaining the industry Appendix B: Explaining the industry- - - -occupation occupation occupation occupation- - - -country specific variation in the data country specific variation in the data country specific variation in the data country specific variation in the data       
 
  Columns  (3)  and  (4)  of  Table  3  in  the  main  text  find  significant  industry-
occupation-country specific variation in our employment data. Although this is not in 
contrast with the  assumptions that allow  us  to  identify the  impact  of technological 
progress and offshoring and although we do control for this variation in our empirical 
analysis, an important question is where this variation is coming from. 
  In this Appendix we find that the significance of the industry-occupation-country 
effect mainly captures the fact that the product mix within aggregate industry groups 
differs between countries. To this end we use data from the ELFS that are not in the 
anonymized version and where the industry dimension is 2-digit rather than 1-digit. 
However, these data cannot be published and we report some statistics here.  
  We constructed predicted employment at the 1-digit industry-occupation-country 




1 2 2 | * 2 1
ˆ
i i i j E c i E jc i E  
where i1 is the 1-digit industry level; i2 is the 2-digit industry level, j is occupation, 
and c is country. That is, we predict employment at the 1-digit industry-occupation-
country level by restricting the distribution of occupations in 2-digit industries to be 
identical across countries while allowing for the different employment weights 2-digit 
industries have within 1-digit industries across countries. We then plot the (1-digit) 
industry-occupation-country  specific  variation  in  the  logarithm  of  this  predicted 
employment series against the (1-digit) industry-occupation-country specific variation 
in the actual log employment data46– it can be seen that all data points lie very close 
to a 45 degree line: the coefficient in a bivariate regression is 0.9920 with a standard 
error of 0.0035 and an R2 of 0.96.         
                                                
46 This is achieved by taking the residuals from a regression of the (constructed or actual) log employment 
series onto a full set of country*year, occupation*year and occupation*country dummies.   69 
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C.1 Construction of the ONET dataset 
The  ONET  database,  version  11,  contains  161  occupation-specific  variables 
(ordered within a so-called content model), many of which can be seen as representing 
certain  tasks.  We  use  96  variables  from  5  different  sections:  from  Worker 
Characteristics, we use Abilities (section 1A), from Worker Requirements, we use Basic 
Skills  and  Cross-Functional  Skills  (sections  2A  and  2B),  and  from  Occupational 
Requirements, we use Generalized Work Activities and Work Context (sections 4A and 
4B).  Several  other  sections  exist,  but  they  were  either  not  good  measures  of  tasks 
(sections  covering  education  levels  and  study  specialization  such  as  in  section  2D-
Education  and  section  3-Experience  Requirements;  working  conditions  and  job 
satisfaction such as in section 4B-Organizational Context); not yet available (ONET is 
still regularly being updated: e.g. sections 1B-Interests and 1C-Work Styles are not yet 
available);  or  did  not  allow  for  comparison  across  occupations  (e.g.  section  4D-
Detailed Work Activities). 
All  96  variables  we  selected  have  the  importance  scale,  where  the  respondent 
and/or  occupational  expert  ranks  each  task  as  not  important  at  all  (1),  somewhat 
important  (2),  important  (3),  very  important  (4)  or  extremely  important  (5).  We 
categorized the variables into one of three tasks (Abstract, Routine or Service) based 
on the ALM-hypothesis of how well technology can substitute for these tasks: this is 
presented in Table C1. We calculate 3 principal components (Abstract, Routine, and 
Service)  at  the  ONET  occupational  level  (also  see  special  issues,  below):  the  scale 
reliabilities are reported in Table C1. We then collapse the principal components to the 
ISCO level by weighing them by their US occupational employment size in 2005, which 
we obtain from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We then have a dataset with ONET task 
measures at the ISCO level. We rescale the three task measures such that they have a 
zero mean and unit standard deviation: these values are reported in Table 4 in the   70 
main text. This ONET ISCO-level dataset is merged with the ELFS dataset which has 
been described in Appendix A.  
 
C.2 Special issues for the ONET data set 
1. Differences between ONET occupational codes and SOC 2000 
The  ONET  occupational  coding is  based  on SOC 2000,  but  differs  in  that ONET 
splits  up  several  SOC  2000  occupations  into  multiple  separate  occupations.  These 
occupations are different, but related, and should according to the developers of ONET 
be given a separate SOC 2000 code in the future. For instance, SOC code 13-2011 is 
accountants and auditors, which ONET divides up into 13-2011.01, accountants; and 
13-2011.02, auditors. We have dealt with these ONET categories by taking a simple 
mean of the importance measure for each task. Although we cannot weigh the task 
importances because of the lack of employment data for these categories separately, 
we  do  not  expect  them  to  have  a  major  impact  since  they  are  extremely  few  in 
comparison to the SOC 2000 codes that ONET does not split up. 
  2. Mapping of ONET occupational codes to ISCO 
  For lack of an official crosswalk between SOC 2000 and ISCO, we have mapped 
ONET occupational codes to ISCO occupations by hand. Since the ONET occupational 
code  is  much  more  disaggregate,  this  was  relatively  straightforward  in  most  cases. 
However,  the ONET  occupational  code does not  contain any clear  equivalent of  the 
ISCO occupation “managers of small enterprises” (ISCO 13); and does not contain data 
for the equivalent of “legislators and senior officials” (ISCO 11). Since we drop ISCO 11 
(see Appendix A), only ISCO 13 remains: we have recoded it as “corporate managers” 
(ISCO  12),  and  hence  assumed  that  the  importance  scores  for  task  measures  of 
corporate managers also apply to managers of small enterprises.  
 
C.3 Robustness checks of task measures using principal components 
  In  this  appendix,  we  construct  alternative  task  measures  which,  rather  than 
based on manual assignment into categories, are principal components. We perform   71 
two analyses here: one where we use the same sub-sample of ONET measures used in 
the construction of Abstract, Routine, and Service task measures; and one where we 
use  the  full  sample  of  ONET  measures  with  the  “importance”  scale.  To  test  the 
predictive power of these “mechanically” generated task measures, we report estimates 
of the conditional labor demand equation (Table 8 in the main text). The results show 
that the two principal components generated broadly correspond to the Routine task 
dimension, and  the  Abstract and  Service task dimension,  respectively. We therefore 
also find negative employment effects associated with one and positive employment 
effects associated with the other principal component.  
  Table C2 reports standardized principal components for occupations ranked by 
the  mean  European  wage.  The  principal  components  reported  in  panel  A  are 
constructed from the same 96 ONET task measures as the Abstract, Routine, Service 
task measures used in the main text whereas those in panel B are constructed from all 
161 ONET task measures that have the importance scale. Within each panel, the first 
two  columns  show  principal  components  that  were  calculated  across  SOC  2000 
occupations,  and  then  averaged  to  ISCO  occupations  using  US  employment  in  SOC 
2000 occupations. The last two columns in each panel show principal components that 
have been calculated while simultaneously weighting by US employment in SOC 2000 
occupations. We refer to this first type as “unweighted” principal components, and the 
second as “weighted” ones, since only the latter has been weighted at the level of SOC 
2000 occupations, but it is worth stressing that both are weighted at the level of ISCO 
occupations (albeit in slightly different ways, as describe above).  
Table C3 shows that these various principal components are closely related to 
our  manually  constructed  task  measures,  Abstract,  Routine  and  Service.  The  first 
principal component, PC1, whether weighted or unweighted, constructed from the 96 
or  161  measures,  is  highly  positively  correlated  to  our  Service  and  Abstract  task 
measures (and negatively to the Routine measure) and the second principal component 
PC2 is highly negatively correlated with our Routine task measure (and positively to the 
Abstract and Service measures).   72 
Table  C4  repeats  our  conditional  labor  demand  estimate  using  the  various 
principal  components  as  task  measures  for  technological  progress  rather  than  our 
manually  composed  Abstract,  Routine  and  Service  measures  –  as  before,  the  task 
measures  are  interacted  with  a  linear  timetrend  to  capture  secular  changes  in 
employment. As before, Panel A uses principal components constructed from 96 ONET 
task measures whereas panel B uses those from 161 ONET task measures and within 
each panel, results using weighted and unweighted principal components are reported. 
This table shows faster (slower) employment growth associated with the first (second) 
principal  component,  which  Table  C3  showed  to  be  positively  correlated  with  the 
Abstract  and  Service  (Routine)  task  measures.  The  point  estimates  on  these  task 
measures are similar in magnitude to the ones reported in the main text, as is the 
point estimate we find on the measure of offshoring.  
All in all, these results suggest our results not driven by the manual categorization of 
tasks  into  aggregate  task  measures:  when  we  mechanically  construct  principal 
components  instead,  these  are  found  to  be  highly  correlated  to  the  ones  we 
constructed and have similar predictive power over recent occupational employment 
changes in our sample of European countries.   73
ARS measure ARS measure ARS measure ARS measure Dimension Dimension Dimension Dimension ONET variables ONET variables ONET variables ONET variables
Originality; Critical Thinking; Active Learning; Learning Strategies; Monitoring;
Coordination; Persuasion; Negotiation; Instructing; Judgment and Decision Making; Systems 
Analysis; Systems Evaluation; Time Management; Management of Financial Resources;
Management of Material Resources; Management of Personnel Resources; Judging the
Qualities of Things, Services, or People; Making Decisions and Solving Problems; Thinking
Creatively; Developing Objectives and Strategies; Scheduling Work and Activities;
Organizing, Planning, and Prioritizing Work; Drafting, Laying Out, and Specifying Technical
Devices, Parts, and Equipment; Interpreting the Meaning of Information for Others;
Communicating with Supervisors, Peers, or Subordinates; Communicating with Persons
Outside the Organization; Coordinating the Work and Activities of Others; Developing and
Building Teams; Training and Teaching Others; Guiding, Directing, and Motivating
Subordinates; Coaching and Developing Others; Provide Consultation and Advice to Others; 
SERVICE SERVICE SERVICE SERVICE Non-Routine
Social Perceptiveness; Service Orientation; Assisting and Caring for Others; Establishing
and Maintaining Interpersonal Relationships; Resolving Conflicts and Negotiating with
Others; Selling or Influencing Others; Active Listening; Performing for or Working Directly
with the Public
Notes: All 96 variables are taken from the ONET database 11, sections 1A, 2A, 2B, 4A and 4B, and have the Importance scale,
ranging from 1 (not important) to 5 (extremely important). We calculate the average US employment-weighted value for each
ISCO occupation after calculating a principal component of each measure at the ONET SOC level. Scale reliability coefficients
are 0.9848 for Abstract, 0.9310 for Routine and  0.9398 for Service. 
Table C1. Table C1. Table C1. Table C1. ONET task measures categorized into Abstract, Routine, or Service task importance measures
ABSTRACT ABSTRACT ABSTRACT ABSTRACT Non-routine 
Staffing Organizational Units; Monitoring and Controlling Resources; Oral Comprehension;
Written Comprehension; Oral Expression; Written Expression; Fluency of Ideas; Problem
Sensitivity; Deductive Reasoning; Inductive Reasoning; Information Ordering; Category
Flexibility; Mathematical Reasoning; Number Facility; Speed of Closure; Flexibility of
Closure; Perceptual Speed; Visualization; Selective Attention; Time Sharing; Speech
Recognition; Speech Clarity; Reading Comprehension; Writing; Speaking; Mathematics;
Science; Complex Problem Solving; Operations Analysis; Technology Design; Equipment
Selection; Programming; Troubleshooting; Getting Information; Monitor Processes,
Materials, or Surroundings; Processing Information; Evaluating Information to Determine
Compliance with Standards; Analyzing Data or Information; Updating and Using Relevant
Knowledge; Interacting With Computers
ROUTINE ROUTINE ROUTINE ROUTINE Routine
Operation Monitoring; Operation and Control; Equipment Maintenance; Quality Control
Analysis; Inspecting Equipment, Structures, or Material; Estimating the Quantifiable
Characteristics of Products, Events, or Information; Arm-Hand Steadiness; Manual
Dexterity; Finger Dexterity; Reaction Time; Wrist-Finger Speed; Speed of Limb Movement;
Static Strength; Explosive Strength; Dynamic Strength; Trunk Strength  74
12 Corporate managers  1.10 -0.46 1.44 -0.29 1.02 -0.66 1.38 -0.49
21 Physical, mathematical and engineering professionals 0.86 0.34 1.24 0.47 0.81 -0.19 1.21 0.06
22 Life science and health professionals  1.01 0.22 1.42 0.32 1.05 -0.04 1.49 0.19
24 Other professionals  0.76 -0.97 0.97 -0.66 0.65 -1.05 0.95 -0.72
13 Managers of small enterprises  1.10 -0.46 1.44 -0.29 1.02 -0.66 1.38 -0.49
31 Physical, mathematical and engineering associate professionals  0.29 0.72 0.53 0.94 0.40 0.61 0.65 0.84
34 Other associate professionals  0.49 -0.78 0.61 -0.55 0.39 -0.83 0.56 -0.60
32 Life science and health associate professionals  0.36 0.08 0.55 0.30 0.40 0.02 0.61 0.27
83 Drivers and mobile plant operators  -0.69 0.36 -0.80 0.86 -0.57 1.01 -0.68 1.32
81 Stationary plant and related operators  -0.61 0.93 -0.59 1.50 -0.49 1.02 -0.50 1.42
72 Metal, machinery and related trade work  -0.42 1.03 -0.35 1.51 -0.30 1.12 -0.25 1.46
73 Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trade workers -1.19 0.45 -1.43 1.20 -1.14 0.26 -1.38 0.77
41 Office clerks  -0.04 -1.00 -0.14 -0.74 -0.17 -1.04 -0.22 -0.81
42 Customer service clerks  -0.14 -1.29 -0.35 -1.10 -0.23 -1.11 -0.36 -0.93
71 Extraction and building trades workers  -0.94 0.35 -1.11 1.11 -0.91 0.61 -1.08 1.11
82 Machine operators and assemblers  -0.77 1.08 -0.79 1.67 -0.69 0.92 -0.76 1.32
74 Other craft and related trade workers  -1.20 0.24 -1.50 0.94 -1.20 0.08 -1.51 0.58
51 Personal and protective service workers  -0.04 -0.46 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.21 -0.06 0.10
93 Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport -0.77 0.32 -0.90 1.01 -0.71 0.57 -0.85 0.99
52 Models, salespersons and demonstrators  0.08 -1.22 0.00 -0.84 -0.07 -0.98 -0.10 -0.73
91 Sales and service elementary occupations -0.68 -0.59 -0.91 0.04 -0.73 -0.21 -0.93 0.19
ISCO 
code
Table C2.  Table C2.  Table C2.  Table C2. Principal components, Abstract, Routine and Service task importance for occupations ranked by their mean European wage
B. Principal components from 161 task 
measures
A.       Principal components from 96 task 
measures
Note: All task importances and principal components standardized to mean zero unit standard deviation. Principal components in panel A are
constructed from the same 96 ONET task measures as Abstract, Routine, Service task measures; those in panel B are constructed from all 161 ONET
task measures that have the importance scale. In each panel, the first two principal components are unweighted at the level of SOC 2000 occupations,
the final two are weighted by US employment in SOC 2000 occupations.
weighted 






PC2 Occupation  75
Abstract 1.00
Routine -0.49 1.00
Service 0.61 -0.68 1.00
PC1 0.90 -0.73 0.80 1.00
PC2 -0.05 0.84 -0.63 -0.37 1.00
weighted PC1 0.93 -0.66 0.76 0.99 -0.27 1.00
weighted PC2 -0.25 0.91 -0.74 -0.56 0.97 -0.47 1.00
PC1 0.93 -0.65 0.77 0.99 -0.27 1.00 -0.47 1.00
PC2 -0.24 0.94 -0.62 -0.53 0.94 -0.44 0.96 -0.43 1.00
weighted PC1 0.94 -0.61 0.74 0.99 -0.22 1.00 -0.42 1.00 -0.39 1.00





Notes: All task importances and principal components standardized to mean zero unit standard deviation. Observation for ISCO 13
(which by construction contains the same task score as ISCO 12) excluded.
Table C3.  Table C3.  Table C3.  Table C3. Correlations between principal components, Abstract, Routine and Service task importances










PC2 PC1 PC2  76
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1.37* 1.30* 1.23* 1.16*
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
-0.43* -0.38* -0.61* -0.57*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
1.36* 1.32* 1.36* 1.31*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
-0.40* -0.32* -0.38* -0.32*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
-0.26 -0.26 -0.27* -0.28*
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
0.83* 0.83* 0.83* 0.83* 0.83* 0.83* 0.83* 0.82*
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
1 1 1 1 1
- - - - - - - -
-0.81* -0.82* -0.80* -0.81* -0.81* -0.82* -0.81* -0.81*







Table C4 Table C4 Table C4 Table C4. Conditional labor demand                                                                                                                                                                 









B.       161 ONET task measures
-
-






Notes: Years 1993-2006, all countries except Ireland. Each regression constrains the point estimate on log industry 
output to be equal to 1, includes dummies for industry-occupation-country cells, and has 32,044 observations.
Point estimates on the principal components and offshorability have been multiplied by 100. Standard errors
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Appendix D: European Restructuring Monitor (ERM) Appendix D: European Restructuring Monitor (ERM) Appendix D: European Restructuring Monitor (ERM) Appendix D: European Restructuring Monitor (ERM)       
 
  The  European  Restructuring  Monitor  (ERM)  contains  summaries  of  news  reports 
about cases of offshoring by companies located in Europe. Started in May 2002, 460 
reports  were  available  up  to  June  20th,  2008.  From  these  news  reports,  called  fact 
sheets, we abstracted information about the occupations that were being offshored. 
Some  fact  sheets  explicitly  stated  the  occupations  being  offshored  (e.g.  call  centre 
workers;  back  office  workers;  assembly  line  workers;  R&D  workers;  accountants), 
whereas in other cases, we deduced the affected occupations based on the description. 
For instance, the first case concerns a factory in Austria where car-seatbelt production 
done by low-skilled women is offshored to the Czech Republic and Poland. Based on 
this description, we classified the affected occupations as Stationary Plant and Related 
Operators (ISCO 81); Machine Operators and Assemblers (ISCO 82); and Laborers in 
Mining,  Construction,  Manufacturing  and  Transport  (ISCO  93).  This  assigning  of 
occupations was relatively straightforward in most cases, both because the reports are 
quite  extensive  and  because  our  occupational  classification  is  very  aggregated. 
Whenever  it  was  not  possible  to  deduce  the  offshored  occupation(s)  from  the  fact 
sheet, we turned to the original news report provided in the fact sheet, and if that was 
not sufficient, looked on the company’s website. Maximizing information in this way, 
we were able to obtain offshored occupations for 415 of the 460 fact sheets.  
  We  then  count  the  number  of  cases  by  ISCO  occupation  as  a  measure  for  that 
occupation’s offshorability: this is reported in Table D1. This table shows that apart 
from the manufacturing occupations (a combined 532 counts), office occupations (141 
counts)  and  (associate)  professional  occupations  (a  combined  111  counts)  are  also 
being offshored relatively often.47  
  A weakness of this approach is that it does not take into account how many jobs of 
an occupation are being offshored, although this number may vary significantly among 
                                                
47  Note  that  the  standardized  values  of  offshorability  presented  in  the  main  text  are  slightly  different 
because there, the same value is assigned to occupations 12 and 13.    78 
occupations. While the number of lost jobs per case of offshoring is provided in the 
fact sheets, we chose not to use this information for two reasons. Firstly, there is no 
meaningful reference to compare these job losses to: the “total employment” figure 
documented  in  some  350  fact  sheets  is  not  uniformly  defined.  In  some  cases 
(particularly for manufacturing), total employment refers to the number of workers in 
that particular plant- and since it is often the case that an entire plant is closed, the 
percentage  of  offshored  manufacturing  jobs  is  close  to  100,  even  though  the  firm 
retains workers of the same occupations in other plants in the same country. In other 
cases, most notably in the financial sector, total employment is measured as nation- or 
even  EU-wide  employment  in  that  firm,  leading  to  very  small  percentages  for 
occupations like call centre workers. Secondly, since one fact sheet usually refers to 
several offshored occupations, the job losses should somehow be divided up between 
these occupations, but there is no way to do this.    79 
Occupation
Corporate managers  12 4 -0.57
Managers of small enterprises  13 0 -0.62
Physical, mathematical and engineering professionals 21 23 -0.35
Life science and health professionals  22 0 -0.62
Other professionals  24 11 -0.49
Physical, mathematical and engineering associate professionals  31 32 -0.24
Life science and health associate professionals  32 0 -0.62
Other associate professionals  34 45 -0.09
Office clerks  41 161 1.26
Customer service clerks  42 32 -0.24
Personal and protective service workers  51 0 -0.62
Models, salespersons and demonstrators  52 0 -0.62
Extraction and building trades workers  71 4 -0.57
Metal, machinery and related trade work  72 81 0.33
Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trade workers 73 2 -0.59
Other craft and related trade workers  74 32 -0.24
Stationary plant and related operators  81 198 1.69
Machine operators and assemblers  82 333 3.27
Drivers and mobile plant operators  83 1 -0.61
Sales and service elementary occupations 91 23 -0.35
Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 93 131 0.91
Table D1.  Table D1.  Table D1.  Table D1. Number of cases of offshoring by ISCO occupation
Source: European Restructuring Monitor 2002-2008. Note: Standardized rank of the number of cases of
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  We  obtain  wage  data  at  the  occupation-country-year  level  from  the  European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living  Conditions  (EU-SILC).  The  ECHP  started  in  1994  and  lasted  until  2001  and 
reports  wages  in  national  currencies,  while  the  EU-SILC  covers  2004-2006  and 
contains wages in Euros. For the UK, we rely on the Labor Force Survey (LFS) which 
does contain wages, unlike the ELFS.  
  We  use  the  gross  monthly  (weekly  for  the  UK)  wage,  and  weight  it  by  persons 
employed and hours worked to obtain two wage measures. Table E1 shows how many 
individual  observations  we  have  for  each  country-year  cell  summed  over  all 
occupations, whereas  Table  E2 shows the average number  of observations for each 
country-occupation cell across years. Although sample sizes are small (except for the 
UK),  we  find  that  the  wage  ranking  of  occupations  is  very  stable  both  across  time 
within a country  – see Table 5 in the main text – as well as across countries over time 
– see Table E3.  
  Since we  need  to control for  the  country-occupation-year specific wages in our 
regressions, we would lose some 35% of our data due to missing wage cells. Therefore, 
we impute missing country-occupation-year cells as described in the main text. Lastly, 
the ECHP and EU-SILC do not contain wage data for Finland and Sweden. For Finland 
and Sweden, we use aggregate OECD data to construct occupational wages using the 
following formula: 
( ) t DE t DE j
t DE
ct






where  jct w  is the average wage in occupation j, in country c (in this case, Finland or 
Sweden) at time t,  ct w  is the median wage in country c at time t, and  ct s  is a measure 
of wage inequality in country c at time t (specifically the ratio of the 90th to the 10th 
percentile derived from the OECD). The variables with the subscript DE refer to the 
value of those variables in Germany. Two implicit assumptions underlie the validity of   81 
this construction: that occupational wage structures are very highly correlated across 
countries;  and  that  the  level  of  occupational  wage  differentials  is  related  to  wage 
inequality in the country.   82
       
      
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Austria 3,865 4,548 5,143
Belgium 2,469 2,248 2,119 2,083 1,995 335 322 1,664 3,538 3,319       
Denmark 2,685 2,519 2,268 989 1,925 1,902 1,808 1,802       
France 5,174 5,098 5,016 4,565 4,377 4,168 4,093 4,048       
Germany 8,278 8,578 8,105 8,454 8,012 7,302 7,794 6,907       
Greece 4,131 3,850 3,569 3,618 3,375 3,155 3,171 3,341 3,498 3,029 3,111
Ireland 3,137 2,650 2,361 2,360 2,248 2,003 1,702 1,525 4,009 4,318 3,987
Italy 8,057 7,858 7,642 7,256 6,860 6,600 6,173 5,879 14,470 13,292 13,127
Luxembourg 867 816 789       
Netherlands 5,214 5,641 5,696 5,678 5,523 5,781 5,953 4,838       
Norway 2,829 2,873
Portugal 3,447 3,628 3,642 3,867 3,948 3,994 4,055 4,035 4,189 3,871 3,622
Spain 6,782 6,178 5,969 5,922 5,758 5,838 5,795 5,708 9,661 9,220 9,743
UK 7,592 34,692 33,983 34,189 68,296 67,968 64,562 61,105 60,665 59,032 55,988 53,124 51,018 47,536
Table E1.  Table E1.  Table E1.  Table E1. Number of wage observations by country and year
Sources: LFS for all years for UK; ECHP for 1994-2001 and EUSILC for 2004-2006 for all other countries. Notes: the ECHP and EU-SILC do not contain
any occupational wages for Sweden or Finland: we impute them using the procedure described in the data appendix.  83
ISCO Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxemb. Netherl. Norway Portugal Spain UK
12 85 102 122 229 178 32 180 103 24 339 269 40 96 3,680
13 22 12 17 17 25 28 83 54 19 115 59 46 28 3,402
21 38 71 99 148 278 102 97 129 25 225 130 55 224 2,122
22 35 80 43 40 278 100 107 138 7 225 82 54 238 1,217
24 151 102 120 133 234 103 125 125 27 294 140 79 151 1,782
31 372 63 110 242 406 100 80 439 29 434 148 92 178 1,221
32 83 106 93 169 406 97 33 377 15 434 159 43 153 1,289
34 227 140 195 485 684 142 150 642 74 468 356 179 434 2,745
41 302 448 270 736 677 459 356 1,426 144 583 201 394 593 7,346
42 611 82 43 116 677 357 86 992 25 583 40 108 492 2,096
51 818 129 244 447 367 238 319 490 64 259 429 460 581 5,883
52 217 70 55 176 212 187 193 318 30 167 195 226 352 3,376
71 110 56 89 236 561 311 141 587 82 186 112 356 604 1,293
72 297 74 104 283 543 154 122 553 34 206 137 250 384 2,335
73 21 30 12 12 543 110 23 379 3 206 17 43 261 388
74 362 57 35 95 561 261 40 486 17 186 36 312 486 518
81 41 36 9 133 340 139 25 286 30 166 46 48 241 416
82 81 64 75 290 234 65 165 311 19 101 71 172 211 1,937
83 114 55 75 181 340 193 135 358 48 166 113 218 323 1,789
91 334 127 109 305 171 182 124 458 96 99 102 477 579 3,543
93 198 108 69 94 216 83 173 188 12 100 15 202 352 1,606
Table E2. Table E2. Table E2. Table E2. Average number of wage observations by country and occupation
Sources: LFS for 1993-2006 for UK; ECHP for 1994-2001 and EUSILC for 2004-2006 for all other countries. Notes: the ECHP and EU-SILC do not
contain any occupational wages for Sweden or Finland: we impute them using the procedure described in the data appendix.  84
Belgium Denmark France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxemb. Netherl. Portugal Spain
Belgium 1.00
Denmark 0.76 1.00
France 0.86 0.87 1.00
Germany 0.90 0.90 0.91 1.00
Greece 0.87 0.83 0.85 0.96 1.00
Ireland 0.91 0.87 0.94 0.95 0.91 1.00
Italy 0.93 0.75 0.85 0.92 0.94 0.89 1.00
Luxembourg 0.90 0.72 0.82 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.95 1.00
Netherlands 0.69 0.62 0.60 0.75 0.75 0.68 0.73 0.66 1.00
Portugal 0.87 0.71 0.82 0.92 0.87 0.87 0.91 0.89 0.77 1.00
Spain 0.91 0.83 0.91 0.95 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.68 0.95 1.00
UK 0.85 0.89 0.91 0.87 0.84 0.93 0.80 0.81 0.65 0.75 0.79
Belgium 1.00
Denmark 0.83 1.00
France 0.84 0.82 1.00
Germany 0.85 0.82 0.94 1.00
Greece 0.86 0.77 0.88 0.93 1.00
Ireland 0.79 0.92 0.92 0.87 0.79 1.00
Italy 0.92 0.81 0.85 0.89 0.95 0.80 1.00
Luxembourg                                                 
Netherlands 0.86 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.87 0.92 0.88 1.00
Portugal 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.87 0.89 0.85 0.89 0.85 1.00
Spain 0.91 0.84 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.89 0.95 0.96 0.87 1.00
UK 0.84 0.88 0.95 0.88 0.80 0.93 0.83 0.92 0.81 0.92
Table E3.  Table E3.  Table E3.  Table E3. Pairwise Spearman rank correlations of occupational wage ranks, 1994 and 2001
Notes: Mean occupational wages in 1994 and 2001, weighted by weekly hours worked, are calculated on the basis of ECHP and EU-
SILC wage data, respectively. All correlations significant at the 1% level.
1994 1994 1994 1994
2001 2001 2001 2001  85 
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Table  F1  shows  that  the  negative  employment  estimated  for  routine  intense 
occupations  is  not  driven  by  a  small  subsample  of  countries:  only  Finland  has  a 
positive (albeit insignificant) employment impact for more routine intense occupations. 
This table also shows that the employment impact of offshoring is less homogeneous, 
with both positive (5 countries) and negative (11 countries) impacts found, and effects 
generally being less precisely estimated than the impact of technological change.  
The interactions of routine intensity and offshorability with industry dummies are 
reported in Table F2. The estimated employment impact for routine intensive jobs is 
negative  within  all  industries  with  the  exception  of  persons  employed  in  private 
households.48  The highest employment decreases for routine intense jobs are found 
in manufacturing, financial intermediation, wholesale and retail and health and social 
work; whereas lower impacts are found in hotels and restaurants, and construction. 
This  seems  broadly  consistent  with  larger  percentage  impacts  for  industries  that 
employ  larger  shares  of  routine  labor.  The  estimated  employment  impacts  of 
offshoring by industry are largely negative, but less precisely estimated.  
                                                
48 The imprecision for this estimate reflects the fact that there is little variation in the routine intensity of 
employment in this industry- the predominant occupations being the non-routine personal and protective 




































Notes: Years 1993-2006; 3,910 observations for each
regression. The regression includes dummies for industry-
occupation-country cells. Task importances and offshorability
have been rescaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. All
point estimates and standard errors have been multiplied by
100. Standard errors clustered by industry-occupation-













Task measure interacted 
with timetrend for Finland
Deviation for:
Austria
Table F1.  Table F1.  Table F1.  Table F1. Country heterogeneity in the conditional impacts of 
technological change and offshoring                                                                                                                            
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and personal service 
Table F2.  Table F2.  Table F2.  Table F2. Industry heterogeneity in the conditional 
impacts of technological change and offshoring                                                                                                                            






Task measure interacted with 
timetrend for manufacturing
Deviation for:
Electricity, gas and water 
supply
Financial intermediation
Real estate, renting and 
business activity




Health and social work
Hotels and restaurants
Notes: Years 1993-2006; all countries; 3,910 observations
for each regression.  The regression includes dummies for 
industry-occupation-country cells. Task importances and
offshorability have been rescaled to mean 0 and standard
deviation 1. All point estimates and standard errors have
been multiplied by 100. Standard errors clustered by
industry-occupation-country. *Significant at the 5% level
or better. 
Persons employed in private 
households
Fixed effects ijc, ict
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The OECD STAN Database for Industrial Analysis is the source for measures of 
country-industry-year  specific  output;  country-industry-year  specific  industry 
marginal  costs;  country-year  specific  income;  country-industry-year  specific  price 
indices; and country-industry-year specific gross capital stock. STAN uses a standard 
industry  list  for  all  countries  based  on  the  International  Standard  Industrial 
Classification of all Economic Activities, Revision 3 (ISIC Rev.3). The first two digits of 
ISIC Rev.3 are identical to the first two digits of NACE Rev.1, the industry classification 
used in the ELFS. Since the ELFS only contains major groups for NACE, this is identical 
to ISIC. However, in the STAN database, data on NACE industry P (Private households 
with employed persons) is often missing or not reliable - we have therefore dropped it 
altogether except for the France, Portugal, Spain and the UK, where it is included in 
NACE industry O (Other community, social and personal service activities).  
The STAN data then covers all 16 countries in our sample except Ireland; and after 
imputing a very small number of missing observations as described in the main text, 
the period 1993-2006 is covered.  
  The measure of output we use is value added (which is valuated at basic prices), 
available in STAN as the difference between production (defined as the value of goods 
and/or services produced in a year, whether sold or stocked) and intermediate inputs. 
In  the  STAN  documentation  value  added  is  recommended  as  a  measure  of  output 
rather than production, since production includes any output of intermediate goods 
consumed  within  the  same  sector.  We  deflate  the  value  added  data  using  country-
industry-year  specific  deflators49,  and  convert  them  into  2000  Euros  using  real 
exchange rates. 
  We  calculate  industry  marginal  costs  as  the  difference  between  net  operating 
surplus and production, divided by production: this gives a measure of average (capital 
                                                
49  Our  results  are  robust  to  instead  using  country-year  specific  inflators, which  is available  for  a  larger 
sample of countries.   89 
and labor) cost per unit of output which in our model is identical to industry marginal 
cost. Here we use production to account for the fact that intermediate goods are a part 
of  production  costs-  in  fact,  the  STAN  methodology  counts  any  capital  costs  from 
equipment  that  is  rented  (rather  than  owned)  by  a  firm  as  an  intermediate  good. 
Intermediate goods also include the cost of offshoring. 
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